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Abstract: 
 
 
 
Based on data from 32 countries over the period 1996-2010, this paper is the first to 
assess the relationship between financial innovation, on the one hand, and bank 
growth and fragility, as well as economic growth, on the other hand. We find that 
different measures of financial innovation, capturing both a broad concept and 
specific innovations, are associated with faster bank growth, but also higher bank 
fragility and worse bank performance during the recent crisis. These effects are 
stronger in countries with larger securities markets and more restrictive regulatory 
frameworks.  In spite of these seemingly ambiguous findings, our evidence points to 
a positive net effect of financial innovation on economic growth: financial innovation 
is associated with higher growth in countries and industries with better growth 
opportunities.  
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1. Introduction 
 
“Everybody talks about financial innovation, but (almost) nobody empirically tests hypotheses about 
it.” 
                                                 Frame and White (2004) 
 
“I wish somebody would give me some shred of evidence linking financial innovation with a benefit to 
the economy.” 1 
 
Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007 to 2009 has spurred renewed wide-spread debates on the 
“bright” and “dark” sides of financial innovation.2 The traditional innovation-growth view posits that 
financial innovations help improve the quality and variety of banking services (Merton, 1992; Berger, 
2003), facilitate risk sharing (Allen and Gale, 1991 and 1994), complete the market (Duffie and Rahi, 
1995; Elul, 1995; Grinblatt and Longstaff, 2000), and ultimately improve allocative efficiency (Ross, 
1976; Houston et al., 2010), thus focusing on the bright side of financial innovation. The 
innovation-fragility view, on the other hand, focuses on the “dark” side and has identified financial 
innovations as the root cause of the recent Global Financial Crisis, by leading to an unprecedented 
credit expansion that helped feed the boom and subsequent bust in housing prices (Brunnermeier, 
2009), by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks (Gennaioli, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 2012), and by helping banks and investment banks design structured products to 
exploit investors’ misunderstandings of financial markets (Henderson and Pearson, 2011). This paper 
uses different indicators of financial innovation and an array of bank-, industry and country-level data 
and analyses to test these hypotheses in a sample of 32 countries over the period 1996 to 2010. 
 
Given the active academic and policy debate on the role of financial innovation, there is a 
striking paucity of empirical studies of the real and financial implications of financial innovation, 
mainly due the lack of data.3  Unlike in manufacturing, patents are scarcely used in the financial 
                                                
1 See “Paul Volcker: Think More Boldly,” The Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2009, p. R7. 
2 In early 2010, the Economist organized a 10-day online debate between Ross Levine and Joseph E. Stiglitz on 
the role and benefits of financial innovation: http://www.economist.com/debate/overview/166. 
3 See discussion in Frame and White (2004 and 2009) who conduct a thorough survey of the empirical literature 
on financial innovation. For theoretical literature related to financial innovation, Duffie and Rahi (1995) 
introduce a special issue of Journal of Economic Theory.  
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service industry or even unavailable, as in the European Union. As a consequence, most existing 
studies focus on very specific innovations such as new forms of financial securities (e.g. Grinblatt and 
Longstaff, 2000; Schroth, 2003; Henderson and Pearson, 2011), the introduction of credit scoring 
techniques (Frame and White, 2004, 2009; Akhavein et al., 2005), new forms of mortgage lending 
(Rosen, 2007; Gerardi, Rosen and Willen, 2010) or new organizational forms, such as Internet-only 
banks (e.g. DeYoung, 2001, 2005; DeYoung, Lang, and Nolle, 2007). These studies so far have 
yielded mixed findings.  
 
On the one hand, there is supporting evidence that financial innovation increases bank growth 
and supports financial deepening. For example, DeYoung, Lang, and Nolle (2007) find that Internet 
adoption improved U.S. community banks’ profitability – primarily through deposit-related charges. 
Several studies document that small business credit scoring increases the quantity of bank lending 
(Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley 2001; Frame, Padhi, and Woosley 2004; Berger, Frame, and Miller 
2005). Saretto and Tookes (2013) find that CDS trading increases bank credit supply, while Norden, 
Silva, and Wagner (2014) show that banks that use credit derivatives as risk management tool pass 
these benefits on to their clients in form of lower interest spreads and cut lending less during the 
recent crisis. Using “counterfactual historic analysis”, Lerner and Tufano (2011) document the 
positive contribution to financial deepening and economic growth of financial innovations, such as 
venture capital and equity funds, mutual and exchange-traded funds, and securitization.    
On the other hand, financial innovations such as securitization change the ex-ante incentives of 
financial intermediaries to carefully screen and monitor the borrowers (Allen and Carletti, 2006). 
Wagner (2007a, b) shows that financial innovation that reduces asymmetric information can actually 
increase risk-taking due to agency problems between bank owners and managers, or because of lower 
costs of fragility. In the context of the recent lending boom and subsequent Global Financial Crisis, 
several authors have pointed to distortions introduced by financial innovations, such as securitization 
and new derivative securities, and how they have contributed to aggressive risk taking, reduction in 
lending standards and thus fragility (e.g., Keys et al., 2010; Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven, 2008; 
Rajan, 2006; and Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny, 2012). Subrahmanyam, Tang and Wang (2014) find 
that CDS trading significantly increases credit risk as financial institutions reduce monitoring, while 
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Wang and Xia (2014) document that banks exert less effort on ex post monitoring when they can 
securitize loans. Overall, there is no conclusive evidence on whether financial innovation is good or 
bad for the financial sector. Meanwhile, none of the existing papers has taken a holistic approach to 
financial innovation and its implications for bank growth and fragility. This paper attempts to fill this 
gap by providing cross-country evidence on the real and financial sector consequences of financial 
innovation, looking beyond individual innovations to broader measures of activities that result in new 
products, delivery channels and organizational forms. 
We follow Tufano’s (2003) concept of financial innovation, which includes the process of 
invention (the ongoing research and development function) and diffusion (or adoption) of new 
products, services or ideas, and focus on R&D spending in the financial sector as well as several 
product or output based measures of financial innovation.5 Specifically, using OECD innovation 
survey data on banks’ R&D expenditures across 32 mostly developed countries over the period 1996 
to 2010 as a broad indicator of financial innovation, as well as a financial system’s securitization 
capacity and the importance of off- to on-balance-sheet assets as gauges of innovation in specific 
areas, we relate financial innovation to bank growth and bank fragility over the period 1996 to 2010 
and bank performance during the recent financial crisis. Using a sample of more than 2,000 unique 
banks across 32 countries, we find that a higher level of financial innovation is associated with higher 
bank growth and higher fragility at the same time. Consistent with these findings, we show that banks’ 
profitability dropped at a higher rate during the recent crisis and the buy-and-hold stock returns during 
the crisis were lower in countries with higher pre-crisis levels of financial innovation.  
The seemingly ambiguous relationship between financial innovation and bank performance 
raises the question of its impact on the real sector. An extensive literature in finance and growth finds 
a positive correlation between financial development and economic growth (e.g. King and Levine, 
1993a, b; Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000), while an extensive banking crisis literature has established 
rapid credit growth as one of the most robust crisis predictors (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 
1998; Jorda, Schularick and Taylor, 2013).6 Similarly, the net effect of financial innovation on 
                                                
5 This is different from Laeven, Levine and Michalopoulos (2015), one of the few other cross-country papers in 
this area, who focus on one specific financial innovation – private credit bureaus. 
6 Loayza and Ranciere (2007) combine these two effects in a panel analysis and find a positive long-run 
relationship between financial development and growth, while the short-run coefficient on current financial 
development enters negatively.  Rancière, Tornell and Westermann (2008) find a robust positive link between 
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economic growth remains an empirical question that goes beyond its effects on banking sector 
outcomes.  We therefore directly investigate the association of financial innovation with economic 
growth to pin down the net impact of financial innovation on the real economy.7  We try to mitigate 
the potential endogeneity problem, which is often a concern in the finance and growth literature, by 
offering several tests of channels and mechanisms through which financial innovation is associated 
with real sector outcomes. Specifically, we use the approach of Bekaert et al. (2005, 2007) to gauge 
the relationship between financial innovation, exogenous growth opportunities and GDP per capita 
growth, and follow the approach by Rajan and Zingales (1998) to focus on the differential effects of 
financial innovation on industries with different growth opportunities (Fisman and Love, 2004; 2007). 
We find that a higher level of financial innovation is associated with a stronger relationship between a 
country’s exogenous growth opportunities and GDP per capita growth and with a higher growth of 
industries that have greater growth opportunities. We also show that cross-country and time-variation 
in financial innovation cannot be explained by growth opportunities. While the cross-country setting 
of our estimations does not allow the definite elimination of any endogeneity bias, this reduces 
concerns that our findings are driven by reverse causation or omitted variable bias.  
 The existing literature on financial innovation also predicts significant differences of its effects 
according to its nature and the regulatory environment and market structure in which financial 
innovation happens and which influence banks’ incentives for risk-taking. First, risk-shifting and 
regulatory arbitrage using new forms of securities are easier to undertake in financial systems with 
larger and more liquid securities markets, which suggests a stronger relationship between financial 
innovation and banks’ growth and fragility in countries with larger securities markets. Second, in 
times of increasing international integration of financial markets, financial innovation not only 
diffuses more easily across borders (as illustrated by the purchase of US-issued credit derivatives 
subsequently purchased by European banks), but its effects are also strengthened by financial 
                                                                                                                                                  
the first moment of credit growth and economic growth, and a negative relationship between the second and 
third moment and GDP growth. Similarly, studies of financial liberalization show its positive effects on financial 
deepening and economic growth as well as dampening effects on consumption volatility, but also a higher 
likelihood of suffering systemic banking crises (Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, 2005; 2006 Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1999; Rancière, Tornell and Westermann, 2006).  
7 The existing literature focus on the effect of financial development (private credit), information sharing, 
financial openness and liberalization, financial integration among others on economic growth (e.g., King and 
Levine, 1993b; Bekaert et al., 2005; Bekaert et al., 2007; Djankov et al., 2007; Houston et al., 2010).  
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integration. Third, financial innovation can arise as reaction to regulation (such as Euro market arose 
as response to regulation Q) or religious restrictions (such as Sharia-compliant financial products). 
Specifically, it has been argued that the main purpose of recent financial innovations has been to 
facilitate regulatory arbitrage by shifting off balance sheet investments that would be more costly 
were they held on balance sheet. This cause of financial innovation implies that, on the one hand, 
more restrictive regulation in terms of activity restrictions and capital might limit the possibilities to 
innovate as well as dampen both positive and negative effects, while, on the other hand, a more 
restrictive regulatory framework might provide banks stronger incentives to innovate around 
regulations (i.e. regulatory arbitrage), which might have negative effects on stability. 
Our empirical analysis shows indeed important cross-country variation in the relationship of 
financial innovation with bank- and real sector outcomes. Specifically, we find that the real and 
financial effects of financial innovation are stronger in countries with larger security markets. We also 
find that financial innovation has stronger positive effects on growth in countries with stronger 
restrictions on banks and overall capital stringency, suggesting that financial innovation can help 
banks work around regulatory restrictions to the benefit of the real economy. We also find some 
evidence for an international diffusion channel of financial innovation.  
Our paper is related and contributes to several strands of the literature. First, we complement the 
literature on the importance of financial innovation by providing consistent cross-country measures of 
financial innovation and relating them to an array of real and financial sector outcome variables. 
Second, we add to the literature that explores the determinants of bank behavior and fragility (e.g. 
Saunders, Strock, and Travlos, 1990; Houston and James, 1995; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Houston et 
al., 2010; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). While our study is not able to directly answer the 
larger questions regarding optimal risk taking, we do provide interesting insights into the channels 
through which financial innovative activity influences banks’ business decisions. Third, our paper is 
also related to the literature on financial crises, particularly the recent one (e.g. Brunnermeier, 2009; 
Johnson and Kwak, 2010; Keys et al., 2010), as we explore whether variation in bank performance 
during the crisis can be explained by pre-crisis financial innovation.  
Fourth, we contribute to the literature on finance and economic growth started by King and 
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Levine (1993a, b).8 Recent contributions have focused on the non-linearity of the finance-growth link, 
highlighting declining, insignificant or even negative associations of finance with economic growth at 
high levels of GDP per capita (Aghion et al., 2005, Rioja and Valev, 2004; Arcand, Berkes and 
Panizza, 2015). We find strong evidence that financial innovation is associated with higher levels of 
economic growth, even when controlling for aggregate indicators of financial development, in our 
sample of high-income countries. This suggests that it is not only the level of financial development, 
but also innovative activities of financial intermediaries, which help countries grow faster at high 
levels of income. Finally, we also contribute to the literature of banking regulation (Barth, Caprio and 
Levine, 2001, 2006 and 2008; Laeven and Levine, 2009). We find that in countries with more activity 
restrictions and less stringent capital regulation, financial innovation is more likely to increase bank 
growth and risk taking. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses our cross-country indicators of 
financial innovation. Section 3 relates financial innovation to bank growth and fragility, while Section 
4 gauges its relationship between real-sector outcome and economic growth. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Measuring Financial Innovation 
The literature on innovation in the manufacturing industry has focused mostly on patents (either 
outstanding or new ones), R&D expenditures, or share of research staff as indicators of innovative 
activity (e.g. Helpman, 1993; Cohen and Klepper, 1996; Branstetter et al., 2006). Gauging innovative 
activity in the financial sector is more challenging, as patents in the financial sector rarely exist and 
not at all in the European Union. R&D expenditures are typically not collected for financial 
institutions nor are data on research staff. This lack of data, as already pointed out by Frame and 
White (2004) has impeded the rigorous study of financial innovation across countries.   
We fill this gap by using an array of different indicators reflecting both input into and output of 
financial innovations. First, we collect data on R&D expenditures in the financial intermediation 
industry from the Analytical Business Enterprise Research and Development database (ANBERD). 
ANBERD was developed to provide a consistent, internationally comparable data set of enterprise 
R&D expenditures across industries and over time, and builds on data provided to the OECD by its 
                                                
8 See Levine (2005) for a literature survey.  
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member countries through the joint OECD/Eurostat R&D survey.9 These data are collected from 
enterprise surveys via the OECD/Eurostat International Survey of Resources Devoted to R&D from 
32 nations in the world from 1987 to 2009. R&D expenditure consists of total intramural (within firm) 
and extramural (acquired from outside) expenditures on R&D following the definition in the Frascati 
Manual. 
We start our analysis from 1996 when data for nearly all sample countries are available, and we 
complement with data from the OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics for some missing 
data in ANBERD. In particular, we obtain banking sector data of 32 countries from SourceOECD 
Statistics, including 26 OECD (as of 2009) and six non-member countries.10 
Based on R&D expenditures, we use two different indicators of R&D activities across countries 
and years.  Specifically, SourceOECD database reports financial R&D intensity relative to the value 
added in the financial intermediation sector (Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added)), and we rely on 
this as our main gauge of financial innovation.11 We use an alternative indicator by standardizing 
financial R&D by total operating cost of banks to obtain Financial R&D Intensity (Cost), where total 
operating cost refers to total non-interest expenses. The information is drawn from OECD Banking 
Statistics. For the missing values in some countries, we complement with data from BankScope, using 
aggregate information for the respective country and year. We note, however, that this alternative 
indicator may overestimate financial innovation, as we divide by costs related to the banking rather 
than the overall financial system. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 Panel A shows that the mean value of Financial R&D 
Intensity (Value Added) is 0.4%, with a standard deviation of 0.56%.  There is both important 
cross-country and within-country variation over time, as indicated by the cross-country standard 
deviation (0.42%) and somewhat lower within-country standard deviation (0.34%). We note that these 
                                                
9 ANBERD contains OECD estimates that adjust for deficiencies and anomalies that exist in the official data 
and might lead to underestimates. 
10 The countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Israel, Romania, 
Russian Federation , Singapore, and South Africa. 
11 Value added is the value of output less the value of intermediate consumption, and it is a measure of the 
contribution to GDP made by an individual producer, industry or sector. Due to the rounding problem in the 
data as reported by SourceOECD database, we calculate our measure using R&D expenditures and value added 
as reported in the database. Measuring the value-added (and therefore the size) of the financial sector, however, 
is challenging, as discussed, for example, by Basu et al. (2011). 
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values are relatively low, though in line with an average R&D intensity of 0.455% in the service 
industry, excluding the financial sector. They compare to an average of 4.812% in manufacturing 
across the same sample of countries and years. This relatively low R&D activity in the financial sector 
shows the relatively limited role of such activities in banking compared to other sectors of the 
economy, but will also bias our estimations against finding significant relationships between financial 
innovation and real and financial sector outcomes. Financial R&D Intensity (Cost) shows a higher 
average value (given the smaller denominator) with 1.06%.  
[Table 1 here] 
While our sample is a relatively homogenous sample of mostly high-income countries, we find 
high cross-country variation in financial innovation.  Appendix Table A2 reports the summary 
statistics of financial R&D expenditures in absolute numbers (millions USD) across countries, 
averaged over the sample period 1996 to 2009. While Hungarian banks report R&D expenditures of 
1.01 million USD, the numbers are 1,358 and 2,042 million USD for the UK and US, respectively. 
Also banks in Australia, Canada, Denmark, and South Africa report R&D expenditures of more than 
100 million USD.12 Figure 1 shows an increasing trend in financial innovation over time across our 
sample countries, more than doubling between 1996 and 2008, before decreasing in 2009, consistent 
with anecdotal evidence on increasing innovative activity within the banking system during this 
period. Behind this overall trend, however, are important cross-country differences, with Australia, 
South Africa and the UK experiencing increasing levels of financial innovation and Switzerland 
experiencing decreasing levels.  
[Figure 1 here] 
While most countries in our sample have developed financial systems, we still find a positive 
correlation between Private Credit and our two indicators of financial R&D intensity, significant at 
least at the 5% level. The pairwise correlation coefficients are 0.290 (Financial R&D Intensity (Value 
Added), p-value=0.000), and 0.098 (Financial R&D Intensity (Cost), p-value=0.048), respectively, in 
line with the innovation-growth hypothesis that financial innovation contributes to financial 
                                                
12 The high expenditure in Denmark might be related to the high share of mortgage credit in this economy, 
while South African banks have undertaken significant attempts at expanding outreach after the end of 
apartheid.  
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deepening. We also find significantly positive correlations between R&D intensity in the financial 
sector and in other sectors of the economy, including the service industry (without financial sector) 
and manufacturing. Finally, we find that financial intermediaries in countries with a higher level of 
GDP per capita report a higher level of financial R&D, though the correlation is not as strong as that 
between financial depth and financial innovation. The correlations are reported in Appendix Table A3. 
As additional test for the validity of our survey-based measures, we compare manufacturing 
R&D intensity from the same OECD survey with patent data in manufacturing from the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Statistics Database. We find a close and statistically 
significant relationship between the two (Appendix Figure A1). This reduces concerns that our survey 
data are driven by country-specific concepts of innovative activity. Overall, this gives us confidence 
that our indicator is a good proxy for innovative activity in the financial sector.  
We recognize that the survey-based nature of our indicators of financial innovation makes them 
susceptible to potential measurement error, even though they have been adjusted for irregularities. 
Furthermore, these gauges relate to different forms of financial innovation, which might have 
different effects on bank growth, risk-taking and fragility. We therefore use two alternative indicators 
of financial innovation that refer to the “output” and specific forms of financial innovation. First, we 
use the ratio of the total value of off-balance-sheet items and total assets, using data from BankScope. 
Some forms of financial innovation, such as credit card receivables, or subprime residential mortgages 
are often portrayed as having led in part to attempts at “arbitraging” regulatory capital requirements 
by booking assets off the balance sheets of regulated banks (Calomiris, 2009). Figure 2 shows a 
positive correlation between the importance of off-balance sheet items in a country’s banking system 
and financial innovative activity, as captured by Financial R&D Expenditures. Given that the original 
data for both are on the bank-level (while the denominators used to construct the indicators are 
different), we present the raw data for both.13 Banks in countries with higher R&D expenditures in the 
financial sector also have larger volumes of off-balance sheet items.  While in our bank-level analysis, 
we use this variable on the bank-level, we use the aggregate value (weighted by total assets) in our 
country-level regressions.  
                                                
13 To control for the large size differences across financial systems in our sample, we use the log for both 
variables. 
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[Figure 2 here] 
Second, we construct an indicator of the securitization capacity of a country, proxied by the sum 
of the outstanding values of all securitized assets in a country, including asset-backed securities (ABS), 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO), mortgage-back securities, and enterprise-backed securitized 
assets, divided by GDP. Securitization has emerged as a major conduit for financial innovations, used, 
on the one hand, to reduce balance sheet constraints on lending; on the other hand, some types of 
securitization, such as ABCP, have been used by banks to retain risks on their balance sheet (through 
explicit guarantees to these vehicles) but reduce capital requirements (Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez, 
2013).   We have data available from 1999 to 2009 for 20 countries in our sample, with data on 
securitized assets from the European Securitization Database, prepared by the Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association and the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME). Figure 3 
shows that countries with higher R&D expenditures in the financial sector have also higher 
outstanding securitized assets. Interestingly, while we find a significant relationship between the raw 
data of Financial R&D Expenditures, total off-balance sheet items and securitized assets, neither the 
ratio of off-balance sheet items to total assets nor securitization/GDP are significantly correlated with 
Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added) nor with each other, which suggests that these indicators 
capture different dimensions of financial innovations.  Using these alternative indicators of financial 
innovation thus not only strengthens our confidence in any consistent results we find, but the lack of a 
significant correlation also allows us to include them in robustness tests in the same regression.   
      
[Figure 3 here] 
With the exception of off-balance sheet items to total assets, which we use on the bank-level in 
the bank-level analysis, our indicators of financial innovation are on the country-level, though 
financial innovation itself takes place on the bank-level. However, we do not see this as a shortcoming; 
rather, the interconnectedness of banks and the fact that many financial innovations carry externalities 
(e.g., completing markets through new securities) beyond the creator of financial innovations justify 
considering financial innovation on the country- rather than bank-level. 
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3. Financial Innovation and Bank Performance 
This section explores the relationship between financial innovation and bank performance. 
Specifically, we relate country-level variation in financial innovation to (i) bank-level variation over 
time in bank growth as measured by growth in bank assets, loans and profits, (ii) bank-level fragility 
as gauged by the distance to default, and (iii) book- and market-based bank performance during the 
Global Financial Crisis. This allows us to test for both the innovation-growth and innovation-fragility 
hypotheses.  While the innovation-growth hypothesis would predict higher bank growth in countries 
with higher levels of financial innovation, the innovation-fragility hypothesis would predict higher 
bank fragility in countries with higher levels of financial innovation, as well as lower book- and 
market-based performance during the recent crisis.  
 
3.1. Financial innovation and bank growth  
Our first test relates bank-level growth to country-level indicators of financial innovation in a 
large bank-time panel dataset. Specifically, we regress bank growth on different measures of financial 
innovation and an array of bank- and country-level control variables: 
Growth i,k,t = αXk,t-1 + βYi,t-1 + γFIi,t-1 +δFIi,t-1Yi,t-1+ νi  + τt  + εi,k,t,    (1) 
In this setup, the indices i, k, and t stand respectively for country, bank and time. Growth is growth in 
total assets, total loans or total profits of bank k in country i and period t. X is a vector of bank 
characteristics, Y is a vector of country characteristics and FI is our country-level or bank-level 
indicator of financial innovation. In our analysis, we use data for more than 2,000 banks across 32 
countries over the period from 1996 to 2010 using the BankScope database. We divide the total of 15 
years into three five-year non-overlapping sub-periods, which results in around 6,000 bank-time 
observations.14 We report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered within both countries 
and time periods (double clustering) and include both country- and period fixed effects, so that our 
regressions effectively capture variation in financial innovation and bank growth within countries and 
controlling for the positive trends towards higher financial innovation over time, documented in 
Figure 1.  We also gauge the differential effect of financial innovation on bank growth across 
                                                
14 Following Bekaert et al. (2005, 2007) we also try overlapping regressions, and our results are qualitatively 
similar. 
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countries with different financial market characteristics, degrees of integration into international 
capital markets, and different regulatory frameworks, by assessing the statistical and economic 
significance of the coefficients on the interaction terms between FI and Y. 
 We include an array of time-variant bank- and country-level factors to avoid that we confound 
financial innovation with other important factors driving bank growth. Specifically, we control for the 
tier 1 capital-asset ratio, the loan-asset ratio, the share of non-lending earning assets in total assets, the 
bank’s market share in the country and period, and a too-big-to-fail dummy variable that takes the 
value one if the bank’s deposit share in a country and period exceeds 10%.  We also control for the 
market structure in a country’s banking system by including the Herfindahl index of market shares 
computed using deposit data and the share of total assets by foreign-owned banks, as well as the 
regulatory framework, by including indicators of restrictions on banks’ activities beyond the 
traditional intermediation business, requirements on banks’ entry to capture contestability, official 
supervisory power, tightness of capital requirements and transparency of financial statements. Many 
of these indicators have been shown by previous work to be associated with bank growth and 
stability.15   In addition, we control for (but do not report) log(GDP), log(GDP per capita) and GDP 
growth volatility, defined as the standard deviation of GDP annual growth rates. 
The regressions in Panel A of Table 2 show that banks in countries with higher levels of 
financial innovation grow faster, consistent with the hypothesis that financial innovation allows more 
rapid expansion of banks.  Columns (1) through (4) show the main results across the four different 
indicators of financial innovation and growth in bank assets as dependent variable, while columns (5) 
through (8) show regressions that gauge the differential effect of financial innovation across countries 
with different financial market characteristics, degrees of integration into international capital markets, 
and different regulatory frameworks; we will discuss the specific variables below. Columns (9) and 
(10) show the robustness of our main findings to the use of two alternative dependent variables.  
[Table 2 here] 
The results in column (1) show that banks in countries with higher levels of Financial R&D 
Intensity (Value Added) experience higher asset growth.  The result is not only statistically 
                                                
15 All variables are defined in Table A1 and descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 Panel B.  For 
conciseness, we do not discuss these here. 
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significant (at the 1% level), but also economically.  One standard deviation in in Financial R&D 
Intensity (0.56) increases annual bank asset growth by 3%, which constitutes 20% of its standard 
deviation and compares to an average growth rate of 11.7%. Our results also suggest that banks that (i) 
have lower capitalization, (ii) have fewer non-loan earning assets, (iii) smaller market shares, and (iv) 
lower loan-asset ratios grow faster, while the too-big-to-fail status (market share of above 10%) is not 
significantly associated with asset growth. We also find that banks in countries with higher entry 
requirements grow more slowly, while other country factors do not enter significantly. This lack of 
finding significant associations between country factors and bank growth might reflect both (i) a 
differential relationship of these factors with banks of different characteristics in the country and (ii) 
the limited variation of these factors within countries over time.  
The results in columns (2) to (4) confirm the positive relationship between financial innovation 
and bank growth for three alternative indicators of financial innovation.  Specifically, column (2) 
shows a significant (5% level) and positive relationship between Financial R&D Intensity (Costs) and 
bank growth, of a similar economic significance as the findings in column (1).16 The results in 
column (3) show a positive and statistically significant (10% level) between the Securitization/GDP 
and bank growth. The results in column (4) show a positive and statistically significant (10%) 
relationship between the importance of a bank’s off-balance sheet items relative to total assets and 
bank growth.  Unlike the other three measures, this one is measured on the bank- rather than 
country-level. One standard deviation in the importance of off-balance sheet items explains a growth 
difference of 0.9% across banks.  In unreported regressions, we also include three of the financial 
innovation measures in the same regression and find that while Financial R&D Intensity (Value 
Added) and Off-Balance Sheet to Assets continue to enter positively and significantly, with even 
higher coefficient estimates, Securitization/GDP loses significance.17  That suggests that higher 
innovative activity by banks and the expansion of off-balance sheet items is associated with faster 
on-balance bank growth, independently of each other, while there is no independent effect from a 
stronger capacity to securitize assets in an economy.   
                                                
16 While the coefficient is significantly lower, the standard deviation of Financial R&D Intensity (Cost) is 
almost four times as high as Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added).  
17 Since Financial R&D Intensity and the other two measures are not significantly correlated with each other, 
we can include them in the same regression. 
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The regressions in columns (5) to (8) gauge cross-country variation of the relationship between 
financial innovation and bank growth by including additional interaction terms of our primary 
measure of financial innovation (Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added)). First, we gauge whether 
diffusion across borders and integration into international capital markets dampens or strengthens the 
positive relationship between financial innovation and bank growth. Specifically, we use the Abiad et 
al. (2010) indicator of financial liberalization which captures seven different dimensions of financial 
reform, especially openness of the banking system, and the Bekaert et al. (2011) indicator of market 
segmentation of equity market (data for 2001-2005). The regression in columns (5) and (6) show no 
variation of the relationship between financial innovation and bank growth across countries with 
different degrees of financial openness (column 5), but a stronger association between financial 
innovation and bank growth in countries with higher level of market integration (column 6). So there 
is some evidence that the diffusion across borders and integration into international capital markets 
strengthens the positive effect of financial innovation on bank growth. Second, we gauge whether 
more developed securities markets in a country enable a stronger relationship between financial 
innovation and bank growth; to do so, we introduce a dummy variable that indicates whether the ratio 
of equity and bond market capitalization to GDP is above the sample median. The results in column 
(7) show that a stronger relationship between financial innovation and bank growth in countries with 
deeper capital markets, consistent with theories that point to the use of capital markets for purposes of 
financial innovation, such as credit derivatives and new forms of securitization to better manage risks 
and expand credit. Third, we gauge whether the regulatory framework has a conditioning effect on the 
relationship between financial innovation and bank growth. The results in column (8) show that the 
relationship between financial innovation and bank growth is stronger in countries with tighter capital 
regulation and higher activity restrictions, while there is no significant interaction with financial 
statement transparency.  This can be interpreted as regulatory restrictions providing impetus for 
financially innovative activities (“regulatory arbitrage”) to expand banks’ balance sheets.  
The results in columns (9) and (10), finally, show the robustness of our findings to using 
alternative indicators of bank growth. Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added) enters positively and 
significantly at the 1% level in the regressions of both bank loan growth (column 9) and bank profit 
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growth (column 10).  In unreported regressions, we also confirm our findings with these two 
dependent variables and alternative indicators of financial innovation, used in columns (2) to (4). 
 
3.2. Financial innovation and bank fragility  
To gauge the relationship between financial innovation and bank fragility, we run the same 
regressions as in the previous section, but using a measure of banks’ distance to default as dependent 
variable. Specifically, we run the following regression   
Zi,k,t = αXk,t-1 + βYi,t-1 + γFIi,t-1 +δFIi,t-1Yi,t-1+ νi  + τt  + εi,k,t,    (2) 
where Z is the log of the z-score of bank k in country i in period t.  The Z-score represents the 
number of standard deviations by which profits would have to fall below the mean so as to deplete 
equity capital (Boyd et al., 2006) and is defined as (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA is the rate of 
return on assets, CAR is the ratio of equity to assets, and σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA. 
The Z-score is a measure of a bank’s distance from insolvency (Roy, 1952) and has been widely used 
in the recent literature (e.g. Laeven and Levine, 2009; Houston et al., 2010; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2010). Since the Z-score is highly skewed, we follow Laeven and Levine (2009) and use 
the natural logarithm of the Z-score as the risk measure.18 
The regression results in Panel B of Table 2 show a negative relationship between financial 
innovation on the country- and bank-level and bank stability, as measured by the z-score, though with 
important cross-country variation.  Specifically, all four indicators of financial innovation enter 
negatively and significantly at least at the 5% level (columns 1 – 4).  The relationship is not only 
statistically but also economically significant.  Using Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added), we 
find that one standard deviation variation in financial innovation results in 0.32 difference in 
log(z-score), around 30% of one standard deviation. In unreported regressions, we find (similar to the 
case of bank growth), that when including three of the financial innovation measures together in the 
regression, Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added) and off-balance sheet items/total assets continue 
to enter negatively and significantly, while securitization/GDP loses significance.  
                                                
18 Some papers have used the transformation ln(1+Z-score) to avoid truncating the dependent variable at zero. 
Following Beck et al. (2013), we take the natural logarithm after winsorizing the data at the 1% level. As none 
of the Z-scores is lower than zero after winsorizing, this approach is similar, save for a rescaling, to the former 
approach and winsorizing after the transformation. For brevity, we use the label “Z-score” in referring to the 
logged Z-score in the remainder of the paper. 
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In unreported regressions, we also explore which of the three components of the z-score drives 
the relationship between financial innovation and fragility. While we do not find significant 
relationships between financial innovation and profitability or capitalization, we find a positive and 
significant relationship between the volatility of ROA (i.e. the denominator of the z-score) and 
financial innovation.  This suggests that financial innovation increases bank fragility through a 
higher volatility of their profitability.  
The results in columns (5) – (8) show important cross-country variation in the relationship 
between financial innovation and bank stability.  As in the case of bank growth, we interact our main 
measure of financial innovation with indicators of international capital market integration, securities 
market development and the regulatory framework. First, the results in columns (5) and (6) show that 
the relationship between financial innovation and bank fragility is less strong in countries that are less 
integrated in international capital markets. Specifically, for countries with market segmentation above 
2.7%, the relationship between Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added) and the z-score turns positive. 
Nine out of the 32 countries have market segmentation above this value. The interaction between 
financial liberalization and Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added) enters negatively, but not 
significantly. Together, the findings provide suggestive but not conclusive evidence that stronger 
integration in international capital markets exacerbates the relationship between financial innovation 
and bank fragility. Second, the results in column (7) show that the relationship between financial 
innovation and bank fragility is stronger in countries with deeper security markets. Finally, the results 
in column (8) show that this relationship is stronger in countries where banks’ activities are more 
restricted, while the relationship is mitigated by more transparent bank statements. There is thus some 
evidence that regulatory restrictions strengthen the relationship between financial innovation and bank 
fragility, while a higher degree of transparency weakens it. 
While we cannot interpret our regression results in a causal sense, the results in Table 2 suggest 
a trade-off between financial innovations allowing banks to expand their balance sheets more rapidly 
but also being associated with higher levels of fragility.  These findings are consistent across 
different measures of financial innovation and show important differential effects across countries 
with different financial structures, regulatory frameworks and degree of integration into international 
capital markets. Specifically, the size of securities markets has an important role in allowing banks to 
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use financial innovations to grow their balance sheets but also expose them to higher profit volatility 
and thus higher fragility.  We find that international capital market integration strengthens the 
positive relationship between financial innovation and bank growth but also between financial 
innovation and bank fragility, consistent with evidence from the recent crisis where international 
capital market integration might have been one of several contagion channels (e.g. Devereux and Yu, 
2014).   
 
3.3. Did financial innovation hurt banks during the global crisis? 
The estimations so far rely on panel regressions relating financial innovation (mostly measured 
on the country-level) to bank-level growth and stability over longer time periods. In the following, we 
focus on bank performance around the Global Financial Crisis, using book- and market-based 
indicators. In the first test, we regress the difference in ROA between 2008 and 2006 on financial 
innovation in 2006 to assess whether banks in countries with higher pre-crisis levels of financial 
innovation in the banking sector showed stronger performance reductions during the first year of the 
global financial crisis. Specifically, we run the following regression: 
ΔRi,k = αXk + βYi, + γFIi + εi,k,                   (3) 
where R is ROA and the right-hand side variables are taken for 2006. A negative sign on γ would 
indicate that banks in countries with higher levels of financial innovation suffered more during the 
global financial crisis, consistent with the innovation-fragility hypothesis. We include the same bank- 
and country-level control variables as in regressions (1) and (2).  When using off-balance sheet 
items/total assets as bank-level indicator of financial innovation, we include country fixed effects. We 
cluster standard errors at the country-level to take into account possible correlation in banks’ 
performance during the crisis not captured by any of the explanatory variables.  
We use a bank-level sample to assess the relationship between pre-crisis financial innovation and 
changes in banks’ profitability between 2006 and 2008. Descriptive statistics for this sample of 1,536 
banks across 32 countries are reported in Panel C of Table 2. On average, banks’ ROA dropped by 1.2% 
between 2006 and 2008.  
 The results in Table 3 Panel A suggest that higher pre-crisis financial innovation is associated 
with higher drops in profitability between 2006 and 2008. All four indicators of financial innovation 
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enter negatively in the regressions of changes in ROA and significantly at least at the 10% level. The 
economic effect of this relationship is also large. Taking the Column (1) estimate, for example, it 
suggests that a one standard deviation in Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added) is associated with a 0.3 
percentage point drop in ROA, compared to an average drop of 1.2 percentage point in ROA. It is 
important to note that even when using the bank-level indicator of financial innovation (off-balance 
sheet items/total assets) and thus considering within-country relationships between financial innovation 
and bank performance, we find a negative relationship.  Our results also suggest that banks with higher 
loan-asset ratios and higher tier 1 capital-asset ratio as well as banks in countries with more transparent 
standard for financial statements performed better during the crisis.  
[Table 3 here] 
A second test of the impact of pre-crisis financial innovation on banks’ crisis performance builds 
on work by Beltratti and Stulz (2012). Specifically, they regress the buy-and-hold stock return over 
the crisis period from July 2007 to December 2008 on an array of bank and country characteristics. 
We follow their methodology with a larger sample of banks and include our measures of financial 
innovation to gauge whether banks in countries with higher levels of financial innovation performed 
worse during the crisis. We include a similar set of same bank- and country-level variables as Beltratti 
and Stulz (2012), but use a larger sample.19 Specifically, we include 487 banks in Bankscope with 
returns available from Datastream, with a loan-to-assets ratio larger than 10% and a deposit-to-assets 
ratio larger than 20%. Bank characteristics are computed using data from 2006 and thus prior to the 
beginning of the financial crisis, while the financial innovation measures are averaged over the 
available years before 2007. 
 The results in Table 3 Panel B suggest that banks in countries with a higher level of financial 
innovation pre-crisis had lower buy-and-hold returns during the crisis. All four measures of financial 
innovation enter negatively and significantly at least at the 5% level. We also find that banks that rely 
more on deposits for funding, higher z-scores, higher diversity in interest- and non-interest income, a 
higher share of non-lending assets and a lower Tier 1 capital ratio have higher buy-and hold stock 
returns.  
                                                
19 Their sample is smaller as they are focusing only on a sample of large banks, with total assets larger than 
$50bn. 
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In a final test on whether our findings in this section are not driven by omitted variable bias, we 
replace the financial innovation indicator with R&D intensity in manufacturing as a placebo test. If 
our indicator of financial innovation reflects a general attitude towards risk-taking in society and the 
findings in this section are thus driven by a spurious correlation, the indicator of R&D intensity in 
manufacturing should also enter negatively and significantly. This test is biased in favor of this 
hypothesis as R&D intensity in manufacturing is positively and significantly correlated with Financial 
R&D intensity, as discussed earlier. 
The results in Appendix Table A4 show that Financial R&D intensity does not proxy for general 
innovative attitude in the economy. Here, we replicate the regressions of the bank growth and Z-score 
in Table 2 and the regressions of change in ROA in Table 3. R&D intensity in manufacturing enters 
positively and insignificantly across all three regressions. In the case of the z-score and the ROA 
change, it thus has also the wrong sign in addition to being insignificant. Overall, these findings 
provide additional evidence that the relationship between financial innovation and bank growth and 
fragility is not driven by a spurious correlation. 
In summary, the results in this section provide evidence for both the innovation-growth and 
innovation-fragility hypotheses. Banks grow faster in countries with higher levels of financial 
innovation, but also experience higher fragility, due to higher volatility of their profits. Financial 
innovation thus seems to be a double-sided sword, contributing to financial deepening and to 
instability.  This raises the question on the relationship of financial innovation with real economy 
outcomes. Does financial innovation support economic growth by supporting financial deepening or 
does it undermine economic growth by resulting in oversized and fragile financial systems?  We will 
turn to this question in the next section.  
 
4. Financial Innovation and the Real Economy 
 The results in the previous section suggest a trade-off in the effects of financial innovation o 
banks’ growth and stability.  But what are the real sector implications of financial innovation?  The 
finance and growth literature suggests positive real sector implications of more efficient banking 
systems; do these findings expand to financial innovation that helps countries deepen their financial 
systems?  Alternatively, and consistent with the innovation-fragility hypothesis, does financial 
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innovation lead to an overexpansion of the financial sector, with higher fragility ultimately 
undermining the growth of the real economy?  In this section, we study the relationship between 
financial innovation and economic growth. 
To address endogeneity concerns and explore the channels through which financial innovation 
might affect the real economy, we focus on exogenous growth opportunities. Theory suggests that 
financial intermediaries are critical in choosing projects and entrepreneurs with the highest growth 
opportunities (King and Levine, 1993a), as well as in monitoring them (Blackburn and Hung, 1998).  
Similarly, by offering risk diversification opportunities, well developed financial intermediaries allow 
investment in high risk but high return projects (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). The 
innovation-growth hypothesis suggests that financial innovation helps financial intermediaries and 
markets improve screening, monitoring and risk management capacities and thus support and fund 
growth opportunities in the real economy.  The innovation-fragility hypothesis would predict no 
such effect or, at a minimum no long-term sustainable growth effect, as financial innovations mainly 
serve regulatory arbitrage purposes and undermine stable financial intermediaries with negative 
repercussions for the real economy.  In this section, we will employ different panel data sets (i) 
across countries and over time and (ii) across countries and across industries, exploring whether 
financial innovation helps countries and industries with higher growth opportunities grow faster. In 
each case, we will first explain the methodology, then describe data and finally discuss the results.  
 One important concern that we want to address before presenting regressions of real sector 
outcomes of financial innovation is that of endogeneity – in faster growing economies or economies 
with higher growth opportunities there might be higher demand for innovative financial products. In 
addition, relating country-level factors such as financial development or innovation always raises 
concerns of simultaneity bias, where omitted factors drive both the explanatory variable of interest 
and the dependent variable.  In the following, we will therefore first present regressions exploring 
factors explaining cross-country and over-time variation in financial innovation, including growth 
opportunities, since our subsequent regression analysis will exploit cross-country and cross-industry 
variation in growth opportunities.  
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4.1. What explains cross-country variation in financial innovation? 
 We first explore factors explaining cross-country and over-time variation in financial innovation. 
We would like to stress that this is far from being a full-fledged analysis of the drivers of financial 
innovation, an analysis beyond the objective of this paper and which we leave for future research. 
Table 4 thus presents exploratory OLS regressions, relating country-year variation in financial 
innovation to an array of country characteristics, including indicators of financial market structure and 
the regulatory framework of countries. Specifically, we use the following regression set-up: 
 
FΙi,t = αXi,t + Year t + εi,t,                    (4) 
 
where i stands for country and t for year. We include year-fixed effects to control for the time trends 
documented earlier.  While we exploit variation in financial innovation both across countries and 
over time, not all our explanatory variables, most notably the regulatory indicators, vary over time.  
To control for this and the correlation of the intensity of financial innovation within countries over 
time but also across countries within given years, we double-cluster our standard errors at the country- 
and year-level.  
 [Table 4 here] 
One of our main variables of interest is growth opportunities, which in the following regressions (as 
well as in the subsequent section) we measure on the country-year level. We follow Bekaert et al.’s 
(2007) methodology and measure exogenous growth opportunities for each country by the weighted 
average of industry price-earnings ratios using data across our sample countries. This measure is 
based on the assumptions that a country’s growth potential is reflected in the growth potential of its 
industry mix and that price-earnings (PE) ratios contain valuable information about an industry’s 
growth opportunities.20 We compute the global growth opportunities of a country i in year t as the PE 
ratios computed on global data on listed companies, averaged across 35 sectors weighed by annual 
country-specific industry weights based on lagged market capitalization. As this measure might be 
driven by differences in persistent discount rates, we follow Bekaert et al. (2007) and remove a 
                                                
20 For a more detailed discussion on the advantages of PE ratios over other measures of growth opportunities 
and details on their construction, see Bekaert et al. (2007).  
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60-month moving average from this measure. The descriptive statistics show an average GGO_MA of 
0.078 across countries and over time, with a standard deviation of 0.419 (Table 1, Panel D). 
 The regressions in Table 4 show that cross-country and over time variation in financial 
innovation is associated with different features of the regulatory framework, the ownership structure 
and the importance of capital markets. Most notably, however, we find no significant relationship 
between a country’s growth opportunities and financial innovation by its banks. Columns (1) to (6) 
use Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added) as dependent variable, while columns (7) to (9) use the 
three alternative indicators of financial innovation.  The results suggest higher levels of financial 
innovation in countries with higher restrictions on banks’ activities, with less powerful supervisors, 
but higher capital stringency and less transparent accounting standards. Overall, this provides some 
evidence for the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis of financial innovation, especially in countries with 
higher activities restrictions and higher informational opacity. While not all of these regulatory 
indicators enter consistently across all specifications, the share of government-owned enters 
negatively and highly significantly in all regressions, suggesting that – for better or worse – financial 
innovation is associated with private bank ownership. While the intensity of financial innovation does 
not vary with the level of banking sector development (as proxied by Private Credit to GDP) and 
market structure (as proxied by the Herfindahl index and its square), we find a positive relationship 
between stock market development and financial innovation. In addition, countries with above median 
securities market depth (comprising equity and debt markets) have higher levels of financial 
innovation. We also find some evidence that financial innovation is lower in larger countries. 
Important for our subsequent regression analysis, we cannot find any significant relationship of 
financial innovation with growth opportunities. The results also show no significant relationship 
between the level of economic development or business cycles and financial innovation. The fact that 
that some of the same characteristics that make a country more or less susceptible to the benefits and 
costs of financial innovation also explain why banks in this country invest more in financial 
innovation shows the importance of a differentiated and context-specific regulatory approach towards 
financial innovation.    
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4.2. Does financial innovation help countries exploit growth opportunities? 
Our first test of the effect of financial innovation on the real economy builds on previous work 
by Bekaert et al. (2005, 2007) who show that exogenous growth opportunities predict subsequent 
GDP growth and more so in countries with liberalized capital accounts, banking systems and equity 
markets. Here, we gauge the relationship between financial innovation, growth opportunities and GDP 
per capita growth in the following regression model: 
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where Growthi,t is the five-year moving average annual real GDP per capita growth in country i and 
period t; GGO_MA is a measure of global growth opportunities and FI is one of our indicators of 
financial innovation; X contains an array of time-variant country-level control variables and Country 
is an array of country dummies. Our sample period is 1997 to 2010 and, following Bekaert et al. 
(2007), we use overlapping five year samples to exploit the time-series information in our sample to a 
maximum and adjust standard errors accordingly. Since Bekaert et al. (2007) find that domestic 
banking development, equity market development and financial liberalization are important for 
exploiting growth opportunities, we also control for the interaction of GGO_MA and (i) Private Credit 
to GDP, which is calculated as the natural logarithm of financial institutions’ claims on the private 
sector divided by GDP, (ii) a measure of financial liberalization, defined as a dummy that takes on a 
value of one if there has been a positive change in financial liberalization index in a specific year 
(Abiad et al., 2010), and (iii) stock market capitalization to GDP to gauge the size of equity markets. 
We therefore pick up any additional direct effect of financial innovation on growth, beyond the effect 
through financial development or financial liberalization. As we include country dummies, our 
coefficient estimates pick up economic relationships relative to country averages.  
The estimate of the regression coefficients β allows us to differentiate between different 
hypotheses regarding the role of financial innovation.  Specifically, a positive β2 would be evidence 
in favor of the innovation-growth hypothesis. In addition and consistent with predictions by Laeven et 
al. (2015), a positive and statistically significant β3 would provide evidence for a channel through 
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which financial innovation enhances economic growth, namely through the exploitation of growth 
opportunities. 
We use annual real per capita GDP growth rates, using data from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI). The average real per capita GDP growth rate (5-year moving average) is 1.5%, 
ranging from -2.8 % in Israel in 2004-2008 to 8.4% in Russia in 2002-2006, with a standard deviation 
of 2.0%.  
The results in Table 5 show a positive and significant relationship between the interaction of 
global growth opportunities of a country and financial innovation and GDP per capita growth. The 
interaction between Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added) and growth opportunities enters 
positively and statistically significant across different specifications and regressions with different sets 
of control variables.  Similarly, our two alternative indicators of financial innovation – Financial 
R&D Intensity (Cost) and Off-Balance Sheet Items/Total Assets – enter positively and significantly 
(columns 3 and 4).21   The level of financial innovation, on the other hand, does not enter 
consistently across the different specifications of Table 5, which suggests that it is not financial 
innovation per se that is associated with faster economic growth, but rather higher levels of financial 
innovation in countries and periods with high growth opportunities. Critically, the positive interaction 
of global growth opportunities and financial innovation is significant controlling for the interaction of 
growth opportunities with banking sector and equity market development and financial liberalization, 
none of which enters significantly.22 The finding that it is financial innovation rather than financial 
depth that is associated with higher rates of economic growth in our sample of high-income countries 
is consistent with other evidence that shows a declining effect of financial development on economic 
growth at higher levels of income per capita or even an insignificant effect (Rioja and Valev, 2004; 
Aghion et al., 2005; Arcand, Berkes and Panizza, 2015). 
[Table 5 here] 
 The effect is not only statistically, but also economically significant. At the mean of financial 
innovation (0.40%), a move from a country and period with growth opportunities at the mean of 0.08 
                                                
21 We cannot use our fourth indicator – securitization/GDP, given limited country and time-series coverage. 
When including both Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added) and off-balance sheet items/total assets, only the 
latter enters significantly.  
22 Note that the insignificance of the interactions of growth opportunities with Private Credit and financial 
liberalization might be driven by the limitation of the sample to high-income countries.   
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to a country and period with growth opportunities of one standard deviation above the mean (0.42) 
predicts an increase in annual real per capita GDP growth by 0.9 percentage points. The same increase 
in growth opportunities in a country with financial innovation one standard deviation above the mean, 
on the other hand, will lead to an increase of real per capita GDP growth by 1.2 percentage points.23 
Given that the mean annual growth rate in our sample is 1.2%, this difference of 0.3 percentage points 
is economically meaningful.   In summary, the evidence presented in Table 5 is consistent with the 
innovation-growth hypothesis.  
 
4.3. Does financial innovation help industries with higher growth opportunities? 
In addition to cross-country estimations, we follow work by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and 
Fisman and Love (2007) to test the effect of financial innovation on the growth of industries with 
different growth opportunities. Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that industries that are naturally 
heavy users of external finance benefit disproportionately more from financial development than 
industries that are not naturally heavy users of external finance, while Fisman and Love (2004, 2007) 
use the same methodology to show that industries with higher growth opportunities grow faster in 
countries with higher levels of financial development.  The methodology has been widely used in the 
recent literature to explore the differential impact of financial development or specific financial sector 
characteristics on the differential growth of industries of different characteristics.24 Specifically, we 
estimate the following model: 
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where Growthi,k is the average annual growth rate of value added in industry k and country i, over the 
period 1996 to 2009.  Country and Industry are country and industry dummies, respectively, and 
Sharei,k is the share of industry k in manufacturing in country i in 1996. We interact growth 
opportunities (GO) of an industry with both (a) a measure of overall financial development (FD) and 
(b) an indicator of financial innovation (FI), measured at the beginning of the sample period. We do 
not include financial development or financial innovation on their own, since we focus on 
                                                
23 To compute these economic effects, we add up the level and the interaction effects of financial innovation. 
24 See, e.g., Cetorelli and Gambera (2001); Beck and Levine (2002); Raddatz (2006); Kroszner et al. (2007). 
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within-country, within-industry variation. The dummy variables for industries and countries control 
for country and industry specific characteristics that might determine industry growth patterns.  We 
thus isolate the effect that the interaction of GO and financial development/innovation has on industry 
growth rates relative to country and industry means.  We include several additional interaction terms 
of growth opportunities with country characteristics, including stock market capitalization to GDP, 
financial liberalization, the Herfindahl index of bank concentration and an indicator of entry into 
banking requirements to thus control for market structure25 and competition in banking and in line 
with previous literature (Cetorelli and Gamberra, 2001). The sample excludes the industrial sectors in 
US, which serves as the benchmark (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). We compute 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered on the country-level. 
 A positive and statistically significant δ1 in regression (6) would be evidence for the 
innovation-growth hypothesis, as it would not only suggest a positive impact of financial innovation 
on industries with higher growth opportunities, but such effect would be in addition to the positive 
effect of financial depth, gauged by δ2, an effect shown by Fisman and Love (2007) and confirmed by 
other authors (e.g. Beck et al., 2008).  
Following Fisman and Love (2007), we calculate the average growth rate in real value added for 
1996 to 2009 for each industry in each country (Average Growth Rate in Real Value Added). The 
industry level data on growth opportunities are from Fisman and Love (2007) and are computed as the 
real annual growth in net sales of U.S. firms over the period 1980 to 1989 using data from Compustat. 
This industry-specific measure relies on the assumption of worldwide, industry-specific shocks to 
growth opportunities; if firms in the United States respond perfectly to these shocks, then the actual 
growth of firms in the U.S. should be a proxy for these growth opportunities.  
The results in Table 6 Panel A show that industries with higher growth opportunities as measured 
by sales growth in the U.S., grow faster in countries with higher levels of financial innovation, even 
controlling for the interaction of growth opportunities with indicators of financial intermediary 
development, equity market development, financial liberalization and banking sector competition and 
contestability. The interactions between growth opportunities and (i) Financial R&D Intensity (Value 
                                                
25 This indicator is from the Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001, 2006, and 2008) database and measures the 
regulatory requirements to obtain a banking license; it has been used in previous work as indicator of 
contestability (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2006). See Appendix Table A1 for details.  
26 
 
Added), (ii) Financial R&D Intensity (Cost), (iii) Securitization/GDP enter positively and significantly, 
at least at the 5% level. The interaction of Off-Balance Sheet Items/Total Assets with growth 
opportunities also enters positively, but not significantly at the conventional levels (column 4).26 
When entering three of the four financial innovation measures (except Financial R&D Intensity 
(Cost)), we find that the interactions of all three with growth opportunities enter positively and 
significantly, suggesting that these three measures capture different dimensions of financial innovation, 
but all with a positive net effect on economic growth. Again, the effect is not only statistically, but 
also economically significant. To illustrate the economic effect, we compute the growth difference 
between industries at the 25th and 75th percentiles of Growth Opportunities and countries at the 25th 
and 75th percentiles of financial innovation. This growth difference is 1.2%, compared to the average 
growth of 2.65% in our sample. While the interactions of growth opportunities with financial 
liberalization enter positively and significantly in three of the four regressions (with the fourth one 
having a substantially smaller sample), the interactions of growth opportunities with the other 
country-level characteristics of the financial system do not enter significantly, including the 
interaction with Private Credit.27 We do not find the insignificant coefficient on the interaction of 
growth opportunities with Private Credit surprising, for several reasons.  First, our sample is limited 
to mostly high-income countries; recent research has shown that there is no significant relationship 
between financial development and economic growth in this country group (e.g., Aghion et al., 2005; 
Arcand, Berkes and Panizza, 2015). Moreover, our findings that financial development enters 
insignificantly, while financial innovation enters significantly suggest that it is not so much the level 
of financial deepening but the innovative activity of financial intermediaries that drives the 
finance-growth link in high-income countries. In unreported robustness tests, we also control for 
reverse causation by focusing on a sample of industries below the respective country’s median 
industry share in total manufacturing. By focusing on industries with a smaller share we control for 
the possibility that larger industries’ demand will drive supply of credit and innovation by financial 
institutions. Our results are confirmed for the sample of “small” industries.  
                                                
26 Later in the subsample analysis we find that the interaction of Off-Balance Sheet Items/Total Assets with 
growth opportunities is significant in the subsample of firms with high security market depth. Also we find that 
it turns significant when we include three measures of financial innovation in one regression. 
27 Out of four model specifications, we only have one significant coefficient estimate of the interaction of 
growth opportunities with private credit (column 2 at 10% level). 
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[Table 6 here] 
The regressions in Table 6 Panel B show that the positive relationship between financial 
innovation and the relative growth of industries with more growth opportunities is driven by 
market-based financial systems. Here we split the sample into countries whose ratio of equity and 
debt market capitalization to GDP is above and below the median value to gauge whether the growth 
benefit of financial innovation is contingent on having sufficient developed markets.28 Re-running the 
four regressions of Panel A for the two sub-samples, we find that it is only in the subsample of 
countries above-median securities market depth, that our measures of financial innovation, including 
the ratio of off-balance sheet items to total assets, enter positively and significantly, while they enter 
insignificantly in the subsample of countries with low security market depth (and even negatively and 
significantly in the case of Securitization/GDP). We also find that in three of the four innovation 
measures, the estimated coefficient on the interaction between financial innovation and growth 
opportunities is significantly different across the two samples.  
In summary, the analysis in this section and the results presented in Tables 5 and 6 are consistent 
with the innovation-growth hypothesis and inconsistent with the innovation-fragility hypothesis.  
Countries and industries with higher growth opportunities grow faster if banks in the country 
undertake more financial innovation, as proxied both by their innovative activities and the relative 
volume of off-balance sheet items and securitization capacity. We note, however, that this effect is 
contingent on having sufficiently developed securities markets in the country.  
In conclusion, we would like to emphasize a methodological issue.  By focusing on 
difference-in-differences regressions – in the case of the country-panel regressions by including 
country dummies and interacting financial innovation with growth opportunities and in the case of the 
country-industry panel by including country and industry dummies – we do not estimate (and 
therefore do not find) that countries or industries grow faster with higher financial innovation.  
Rather, we find that financial innovation helps exploit growth opportunities, with the documented 
positive growth effects being relative to overall industry or country growth.  This approach allows us 
to mitigate (though not eliminate) endogeneity concerns associated with cross-country regressions    
                                                
28 Note that here we do not perform interaction analysis as in Table 2 because it is difficult to interpret triple 
interaction terms. 
28 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
The recent Global Financial Crisis has spurred renewed debates on the “bright” and “dark” sides 
of financial innovation.  We find supportive evidence for both the innovation-growth and the 
innovation-fragility views. Overall, our results suggest that there are both “bright” and “dark” sides to 
financial innovation. Financial innovation is associated with more aggressive risk-taking by banks and 
higher bank growth, which helps provide valuable credit and risk diversification services to firms and 
households, which in turn enhances capital allocation efficiency and economic growth. On the 
downside, the “dark” side of greater risk taking is that it significantly increases the banks’ profit 
volatility, their fragility and their losses during a banking crisis. On net, however, financial innovation 
allows countries to grow faster by helping them exploit exogenously given growth opportunities.   
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Table 1  
Summary statistics 
 
Panel A. Measures of financial innovation 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
No. of 
Countries No. of Obs. 
Financial R&D Intensity (Value 
Added),  1996-2009 0.399% 0.560% 0 3.140% 32 411 
Financial R&D Intensity (Cost),  
1996-2009 1.057% 2.066% 0 11.528% 32 403 
Securitization/GDP, 1999-2009 6.214% 9.653% 2.1E-04% 34.844% 20 161 
Off-Balance-Sheet Items/Total  
Assets,  1996-2009 14.082% 10.741% 1.328% 40.362% 32 346 
Note: The 32 countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. 
Panel B. Bank risk taking analysis 1996-2010 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
No. of 
Countries 
No. of Obs.  
(Bank-time) 
Bank Level Data 
      Bank Asset Growth 0.117  0.152  -0.329  1 32  6,030 
Bank Loan Growth 0.013  0.096  -0.501  1 32  6,033 
Bank Profit Growth 0.033  0.377  -1 1 32  5,885 
Log Z-score 3.618  1.051  1.228  6.152  32  6,030 
Bank Market Share 0.011  0.049  7.820E-06 0.392  32  6,030 
Loan to Asset Ratio 0.644  0.141  0.044  0.925  32  6,030 
Tier 1 Captal Ratio 0.086  0.035  0.026  0.289  32  6,030 
Other Earning Assets 0.246  0.133  0.004  0.764  32  6,030 
Too-big-to-fail 0.036  0.177  0 1 32  6,030 
 
      Country Level Data 
      Overall Activities Restrictions 8.054  1.047  3 10 32  6,030 
Official Supervisory Power 7.630  0.541  6 8 32  6,030 
Entry into Banking Requirements 12.918  1.671  6 14.5 32  6,030 
Tight Capital Regulation 0.040  0.195  0 1 32  6,030 
Financial Statement 
Transparency 4.987  0.359  3 6 32  6,030 
HHI 0.071  0.111  0.028  0.646  32  6,030 
Foreign Bank Ownership 0.137  0.101  0.000  0.858  32  6,030 
Log GDP Per Capita 10.413  0.416  7.879  10.824  32  6,030 
Log GDP 29.542  1.108  24.945  30.211  32  6,030 
GDP Growth Volatility 0.030  0.043  0.012  0.248  32  6,030 
Financial Liberalization 0.236  0.425  0 1 32  6,030 
Market Segmentation 0.019  0.013  0.012  0.088  32  5,904 
Market Segmentation 2001-2005 0.012  0.010  0.007  0.068  32  5,904 
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R&D Intensity in Manufacturing 
Industry (Placebo Test) 0.082  0.020  0.005  0.132  32  5,853 
Note: The 32 countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Panel C. Bank performance change during crisis period analysis 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
No. of 
Countries 
No. of Obs.  
(Bank-time) 
Bank Level Data 
      Change in ROA  
(ROA2008 - ROA2006) -0.012  0.026  -0.212  0.032  32 1,536 
Change in ROE  
(ROE2008 - ROE2006) -0.118  0.228  -1.240  0.454  32 1,533 
Buy-and-Hold Stock Returns 
July 2007-December 2008 
-0.420  0.289  -0.975  0.528  20 487 
Tier 1 Captial Ratio 0.121  0.124  -0.137  2.414  32 1,537 
Too-big-to-fail 0.056  0.230  0 1 32 1,537 
Bank Market Share 0.018  0.050  0 0.531  32 1,537 
Loan to Asset Ratio 0.604  0.227  -0.004  0.990  32 1,537 
 
      Country Level Data 
      Overall Activities Restrictions 6.881  1.769  3.273  9.727  32 1,537 
Official Supervisory Power 11.119  2.338  6.364  14.136  32 1,537 
Entry into Banking Requirements 7.494  0.675  4.091  8.000  32 1,537 
Capital Regulatory Index 6.641  1.191  3.273  9.636  32 1537 
Financial Statement 
Transparency 4.984  0.571  3.636  6 32 1,537 
HHI 0.098  0.063  0.045  0.275  32 1,537 
Log GDP Per Capita 10.071  0.726  7.758  10.697  32 1,537 
Log GDP 28.100  1.593  24.667  29.946  32 1,537 
Foreign Bank Ownership 0.143  0.105  0 0.888  32  1,537 
R&D Intensity in Manufacturing 
Industry (Placebo Test) 28.100  1.593  24.667  29.946  32 1,196 
Note: The 32 countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. 
Panel D. Exogenous growth opportunity analysis 1997-2010 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
No. of 
Countries No. of Obs. 
Annual Real GDP Growth  
(5-year horizon) 0.015  0.020  -0.027  0.084  31  359 
GGO_MA 0.078  0.419  -0.557  2.646  31  359 
Private Credit 4.397  0.741  2.272  5.408  32  359 
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Stock Market Cap 0.796  0.597  0.010  3.034  31  359 
Recession 0.188  0.392  0  1  31  359 
Financial Liberalization 0.174  0.380  0  1  32  264 
Note: The 31 countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, and United States. 
Panel E. Industrial growth and volatility analysis 1996-2009 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
No. of 
Countries No. of Obs. 
Average Growth Rate in Real 
Value Added  2.647% 11.842% -40.104% 57.398% 28  704 
GO 0.351  0.390  -0.450  1.490  28  709 
Private Credit 4.170  0.693  2.551  4.934  28  723 
Stock Market Cap 0.586  0.414  0.071  1.724  28  723 
Financial Liberalization 0.194  0.155  0.000  0.600  28  723 
HHI 0.390  0.222  0.121  0.878  28  723 
Entry into Banking Requirements 7.368  0.951  4.091  8.000  28  723 
Industry's Initial Share of Total 
Manufacturing VA 0.023  0.024  0.000  0.110  28  723 
Note: The 28 countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and United Kingdom. 
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Table 2 
Financial innovation, bank growth and bank risk taking: OLS regressions 
 
The sample period is from 1996 to 2010, which has a total of 15 years and provides three five-year non-overlapping sub-periods. The dependent variable is bank asset growth, 
loan growth, or profit growth in Panel A, and log z-score or Sharpe ratio in Panel B. Z-score= (ROA+CAR)/ σ(ROA), where ROA= π/A as return on asset, and CAR= E/A as 
capital-asset ratio. σ(ROA) is standard deviation of ROA over a five-year window. Higher z-score implies more stability and less bank risk taking. Securitization measures the 
securitization capacity of a country, proxied by the summation of the outstanding value of all the securitization assets, including Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) (including 
auto, consumer, credit cards, leases, and others), CDO, Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) (including CMBS, mixed, and RMBS),  Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), 
and Whole Business Securitization (WBS). The data is available from 1999 to 2009 for about 20 countries in our sample. The data comes from European Securitization 
database, prepared by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) in partnership with the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME). Bank 
market share is the share of each bank’s deposits to total deposits within a given country. Loan to asset ratio is defined as the ratio of loans to total assets. Too-big-to-fail is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if the bank’s share in the country’s total deposits exceeds 10%. HHI is the Herfindahl index, defined as the sum of the squared 
shares of bank deposits to total deposits within a given country. Other country controls include log GDP, log GDP per capita, and GDP growth volatility. GDP growth 
volatility is the standard deviation of GDP growth in the previous five years. Detailed variable definitions and descriptions can be found in Appendix Table A1. This table 
reports the impacts of financial R&D intensity on bank growth and risk taking across around 6, 000 bank-time observations in 32 countries. Four measures are applied for 
financial innovation. We control for unobserved heterogeneity at the country and time level by including country and time fixed effects and the coefficients are not reported 
for brevity. The estimation is based on OLS. All regressions are cross-sectional time-series with one observation per bank each time period. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustering within countries and time (double clustering) are reported in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Panel A. Financial innovation and bank growth 
  Bank Asset Growth 
Bank Loan 
Growth 
Bank 
Profit 
Growth 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Financial R&D Intensity (Value 
Added) 0.054***    0.133** 0.175*** 0.053*** 0.073** 0.041*** 0.153*** 
 [0.015]    [0.056] [0.051] [0.019] [0.031] [0.011] [0.056] Financial R&D Intensity (Cost)  0.013**         
 
 [0.007]         
Securitization/GDP   0.003*        
   
[0.002]        Off-Balance-Sheet Items/Total  
Assets    0.006*       
    
[0.003]       Financial Liberalization × Financial 
R&D Intensity (Value Added)     -0.093      
 
    [0.154]      
Market Segmentation × Financial 
R&D Intensity (Value Added)      -0.058**     
 
     [0.023]     
Financial R&D Intensity (Value 
Added) × High Security Market 
Depth       
0.041***    
 
      [0.009]    
Financial R&D Intensity (Value 
Added) × Overall Activities 
Restrictions       
 
0.040*   
 
      
 
[0.024]   
Financial R&D Intensity (Value 
Added) × Tight Capital Regulation        
-0.025**   
 
       [0.012]   
Financial R&D Intensity (Value 
Added) × Financial Statement 
Transparency 
       -0.049   
        
[0.033]   
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High Security Market Depth       0.027*    
 
      [0.015]    
Overall Activities Restrictions -0.013 -0.007 -0.014* -0.004 -0.002 -0.008 0.021* -0.000 -0.004 -0.002 
 
[0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.012] [0.011] [0.007] [0.011] [0.005] [0.005] [0.023] 
Entry into Banking Requirements 
-0.034** -0.017 -0.015 0.046*** -0.055** -0.026 -0.069*** -0.007 0.012 0.037 
 
[0.016] [0.018] [0.018] [0.015] [0.026] [0.016] [0.021] [0.010] [0.011] [0.054] 
Official Supervisory Power -0.003 -0.000 -0.002 -0.021*** 0.003 0.001 0.022** -0.000 -0.005 -0.035 
 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.006] [0.010] [0.005] [0.004] [0.022] 
Tight Capital Regulation -0.004 -0.030 -0.023 -0.025** -0.003 0.005 -0.016 -0.032 -0.050*** 0.154*** 
 
[0.017] [0.022] [0.022] [0.012] [0.020] [0.017] [0.021] [0.021] [0.016] [0.056] 
Financial Statement Transparency 
0.022 0.032** 0.038** 0.061*** 0.003 0.027* -0.026 0.019* 0.015 0.101** 
 
[0.015] [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.026] [0.016] [0.020] [0.011] [0.009] [0.042] 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio -0.211** -0.211** -0.252*** 0.132 -0.270*** -0.198** -0.275*** -0.179* 0.131 -0.215 
 
[0.087] [0.086] [0.090] [0.112] [0.081] [0.088] [0.081] [0.095] [0.099] [0.179] 
Other Earning Assets -0.208*** -0.205*** -0.184*** 0.030 -0.214*** -0.209*** -0.216*** -0.194*** 0.011 0.020 
 
[0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.026] [0.039] [0.037] [0.039] [0.039] [0.028] [0.105] 
Bank Market Share -0.434*** -0.464*** -0.577*** 0.130 -0.500*** -0.426*** -0.484*** -0.389*** 0.067 -0.179 
 
[0.134] [0.132] [0.146] [0.119] [0.183] [0.135] [0.181] [0.136] [0.098] [0.419] 
Loan to Asset Ratio -0.092** -0.090** -0.055 -0.024 -0.090** -0.091** -0.094** -0.092*** -0.044 0.272** 
 
[0.037] [0.037] [0.043] [0.036] [0.040] [0.036] [0.039] [0.035] [0.038] [0.123] 
Too-Big-To-Fail 0.028 0.037 0.044* -0.039* 0.061* 0.032 0.059* 0.016 -0.019 0.064 
 
[0.026] [0.025] [0.024] [0.023] [0.034] [0.027] [0.033] [0.024] [0.018] [0.084] 
HHI 1.053 0.851 1.176 -0.168 1.354 0.917 0.529 0.781 0.317 -0.878 
 
[0.717] [0.662] [0.718] [0.449] [0.901] [0.675] [0.806] [0.564] [0.443] [1.860] 
Foreign Bank Ownership -0.141 -0.061 0.022 -0.234*** -0.380* -0.167 -0.652*** -0.109 -0.108 -0.211 
  [0.142] [0.140] [0.145] [0.060] [0.209] [0.139] [0.151] [0.100] [0.066] [0.353] 
Other Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,918 6,030 4,637 5,605 5,657 5,904 5,657 5,914 6,033 5,885 
Adjusted R2 0.179 0.193 0.243 0.086 0.177 0.179 0.183 0.163 0.085 0.157 
Panel B. Financial innovation and bank risk taking 
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Log Z-score 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added) 
-0.563**    -1.120* -1.736*** -0.777*** -1.188*** 
 [0.265]    [0.584] [0.437] [0.289] [0.409] Financial R&D Intensity (Cost)  -0.139***       
  [0.040]       Securitization/GDP   -0.060***      
 
  [0.023]      Off-Balance-Sheet Items/Total  Assets 
   -1.443***     
    [0.379]     
Financial Liberalization × Financial R&D 
Intensity (Value Added)     -0.312    
     [1.299]    
Market Segmentation × Financial R&D 
Intensity (Value Added)      0.520***   
 
     [0.174]   Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added) × High 
Security Market Depth 
      -2.477***  
       [0.540]  
Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added) × 
Overall Activities Restrictions 
       -0.803* 
 
       [0.447] Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added) × Tight 
Capital Regulation        0.314 
 
       [0.215] 
Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added) × 
Financial Statement Transparency 
       0.522* 
        [0.284] 
High Security Market Depth 
      0.832  
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      [0.776]  Overall Activities Restrictions 0.011 -0.041 -0.031 -0.114 -0.098 0.016 -0.089 0.018 
 [0.035] [0.026] [0.058] [0.111] [0.073] [0.037] [0.056] [0.034] 
Entry into Banking Requirements 0.208** 0.112* 0.095 0.100 0.209 0.152* 0.056 0.093 
 [0.088] [0.059] [0.145] [0.196] [0.152] [0.088] [0.112] [0.082] 
Official Supervisory Power 0.068* 0.030 0.023 0.033 0.114* 0.079** 0.162*** 0.065* 
 [0.035] [0.020] [0.048] [0.154] [0.063] [0.034] [0.055] [0.035] 
Tight Capital Regulation 0.022 0.109 0.276** 0.011 -0.328 -0.075 -0.204* 0.005 
 [0.180] [0.088] [0.136] [0.196] [0.263] [0.181] [0.107] [0.128] 
Financial Statement Transparency -0.053 -0.078 -0.069 0.018 0.055 -0.075 0.054 -0.152 
 [0.101] [0.058] [0.089] [0.225] [0.163] [0.097] [0.128] [0.178] 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 4.650*** 4.753*** 3.373** 5.454*** 5.399*** 4.617*** 5.362*** 4.665*** 
 [1.075] [1.269] [1.508] [0.838] [0.934] [1.091] [0.943] [1.078] 
Other Earning Assets 2.433*** 2.452*** 2.209*** 2.563*** 2.559*** 2.425*** 2.558*** 2.437*** 
 [0.259] [0.336] [0.256] [0.335] [0.228] [0.265] [0.227] [0.257] 
Bank Market Share 1.346** 1.205 1.771** 1.722 1.616** 1.267** 1.418* 1.170* 
 [0.602] [0.831] [0.789] [1.508] [0.786] [0.608] [0.808] [0.601] 
Loan to Asset Ratio 0.810*** 0.799*** 0.507** 0.910** 0.915*** 0.803*** 0.906*** 0.809*** 
 [0.226] [0.274] [0.250] [0.359] [0.217] [0.230] [0.215] [0.226] 
Too-Big-To-Fail -0.223 -0.204 -0.099 -0.356 -0.329 -0.205 -0.303 -0.196 
 [0.168] [0.156] [0.181] [0.308] [0.224] [0.171] [0.232] [0.170] 
HHI -2.299*** -1.962*** 0.235 -1.953 -2.181** -2.014*** -1.632* -1.988*** 
 [0.512] [0.179] [0.366] [1.880] [1.046] [0.514] [0.918] [0.499] 
Foreign Bank Ownership 0.716 0.273 0.638 2.285* 1.199* 0.525 0.875 0.739* 
  [0.453] [0.394] [0.577] [1.274] [0.698] [0.399] [0.585] [0.446] 
Other Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,746 5,884 4,689 5,491 5,523 5,740 5,527 5,746 
Adjusted R2 0.168 0.171 0.153 0.166 0.166 0.168 0.168 0.168 
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Table 3 
Financial innovation and bank performance change in the recent financial crisis  
 
The table presents the results of financial innovation and bank performance in the recent financial crisis period. 
In Panel A., the dependent variable is the performance change (ROA) between 2008 and 2006 for each bank, 
calculated as the difference of ROA value between 2008 and 2006. ROA refers to return on asset. In Panel B, the 
dependent variable is buy-and-hold stock for each bank over the period returns July 2007-December 2008. The 
sample includes 1,536 banks in BankScope in Panel A, and 487 banks in BankScope in Panel B with returns 
available from Datastream, with a loan-to-assets ratio larger than 10%, a deposit-to-assets ratio larger than 20%. 
Bank characteristics are computed using data from 2006, prior to the beginning of the financial crisis. Four 
measures of financial innovation are applied. Financial R&D intensity (value added), financial R&D intensity 
(cost), and Off-Balance-Sheet Items/Total Assets are averaged from 1996 to 2006, Securitization/GDP is 
averaged from 1999 to 2006.  Securitization measures the securitization capacity of a country, proxied by the 
summation of the outstanding value of all the securitization assets, including Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) 
(including auto, consumer, credit cards, leases, and others), CDO, Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) 
(including CMBS, mixed, and RMBS),  Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), and Whole Business 
Securitization (WBS). The data is available from 1999 to 2009 for about 20 countries in our sample. The data 
comes from European Securitization database, prepared by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA) in partnership with the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME). Bank 
market share is the share of each bank’s deposits to total deposits within a given country. Loan to asset ratio is 
defined as the ratio of loans to total assets. Too-big-to-fail is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the 
bank’s share in the country’s total deposits exceeds 10%. HHI is the Herfindahl index, defined as the sum of the 
squared shares of bank deposits to total deposits within a given country. Other country controls include log GDP, 
log GDP per capita, GDP growth volatility, creditor rights, and information sharing. GDP growth volatility is the 
standard deviation of GDP growth in the previous five years. We also control for beta and real estate beta as in 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) in Panel B. Beta is defined as the slope of the regression of weekly excess stock 
returns on the MSCI World excess return for the period 2004–2006 and real estate beta is defined as the slope of 
the regression of weekly excess stock returns on the Fama and French real estate industry excess return in a 
regression that controls for the MSCI World excess return for the period 2004–2006. Detailed variable 
definitions and descriptions of other variables can be found in Appendix Table A1. Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets.*, **, *** represent statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Panel A. Change in ROA   
  Change in ROA 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added) -0.011***    
 [0.003]    
Financial R&D Intensity (Cost)  -0.001
**   
 
 [0.000]   
Securitization/GDP   -0.009
*  
   
[0.005]  
Off-Balance-Sheet Items/Total  Assets    -0.005
*** 
 
   [0.001] 
Overall Activities Restrictions -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]  
Entry into Banking Requirements 0.001 0.000 0.002  
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]  
Official Supervisory Power -0.000 0.000 -0.000  
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]  
Capital Regulatory Index -0.000 -0.002 -0.002  
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003]  
Financial Statement Transparency 0.002** 0.002* 0.003**  
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]  
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.068*** 0.079*** 
 
[0.020] [0.020] [0.021] [0.021] 
Bank Market Share 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.009 
 
[0.021] [0.021] [0.025] [0.021] 
Loan to Asset Ratio 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Too-Big-To-Fail 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] 
HHI -0.025 -0.045 -0.088**  
 
[0.024] [0.030] [0.042]  
Foreign Bank Ownership -0.000 -0.000 -0.012  
  [0.003] [0.003] [0.012]   
Other Country Controls Yes Yes Yes No 
Country Fixed Effects No No No Yes 
Observations 1,536 1,536 1,337 1,536 
Adjusted R2 0.114 0.111 0.090 0.121 
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Panel B. Buy-and-hold stock returns July 2007-December 2008 
  Buy-and-hold Stock Returns July 2007-December 2008 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added) -0.201*    
 [0.113]    Financial R&D Intensity (Cost)  -0.033
**   
 
 [0.015]   
Securitization/GDP   -1.663
***  
   
[0.243]  
Off-Balance-Sheet Items/Total  Assets    -0.029
*** 
    
[0.005] 
Tangible Equity 0.974 1.061 2.075** 2.205** 
 
[0.691] [0.698] [0.935] [0.868] 
Deposits 0.577*** 0.586*** 0.658*** 0.628*** 
 
[0.112] [0.107] [0.087] [0.083] 
Funding Fragility 0.152* 0.135* 0.109 0.100 
 
[0.076] [0.078] [0.101] [0.100] 
Loan to Asset Ratio -0.325*** -0.322*** -0.230** -0.182 
 
[0.095] [0.090] [0.103] [0.118] 
Log Assets -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.017* 
 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.010] 
Log Z-score 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 
 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] 
Non-interest -0.426*** -0.435*** -0.155 -0.266* 
 
[0.096] [0.102] [0.123] [0.142] 
Income Diversity 0.420*** 0.422*** 0.286*** 0.361*** 
 
[0.060] [0.061] [0.060] [0.072] 
Other Earning Assets 0.321*** 0.325*** 0.419*** 0.439*** 
 
[0.105] [0.105] [0.126] [0.135] 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio -1.284** -1.436** -3.032*** -3.046*** 
 
[0.561] [0.561] [0.900] [0.840] 
2006 Return 0.047* 0.044* 0.055* 0.041 
 
[0.024] [0.024] [0.029] [0.025] 
Overall Activities Restrictions 0.018 0.011 -0.042  
 
[0.018] [0.022] [0.032]  
Entry into Banking Requirements 0.121*** 0.115*** 0.620***  
 
[0.024] [0.030] [0.091]  
Official Supervisory Power 0.044** 0.052** -0.000  
 
[0.019] [0.020] [0.019]  
Capital Regulatory Index -0.070*** -0.072*** -0.131***  
 
[0.020] [0.018] [0.040]  
Financial Statement Transparency 0.265*** 0.293*** -0.072**  
 
[0.051] [0.046] [0.029]  
HHI 0.398 0.325 -0.987***  
 
[0.313] [0.267] [0.122]  
Foreign Bank Ownership -0.291 -0.384 -3.152***  
  [0.354] [0.380] [0.532]   
Other Country Controls Yes Yes Yes No 
Country Fixed Effects No No No Yes 
Observations 486 486 463 487 
Adjusted R2 0.210 0.211 0.215 0.215 
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Table 4 
Determinants of financial innovation 1996-2009 
 
The dependent variable is Financial R&D Intensity, which is defined as the financial R&D expenditure scaled by total value added of the financial intermediation industry in 
the previous year. We further multiply Financial R&D Intensity by 100 to scale the estimated coefficients in our empirical results. All independent variables except measures 
of banking regulation are lagged by one year. Recession is a dummy variable indicating whether a country is experiencing a recession in a particular year, which is 
constructed following Braun and Larrain (2005). Security market depth is measured by the summation of the value of listed shares to GDP, the private domestic debt 
securities issued by financial institutions and corporations as a share of GDP, and the public domestic debt securities issued by government as a share of GDP. Detailed 
variable definitions and descriptions can be found in Appendix Table A1. This table reports the impacts of bank regulation, tax rates, bank ownership and other variables of 
interest on financial R&D intensity across time and 32 countries. All regressions are time-series cross-sectional with one observation per country per year. The estimation is 
based on OLS regressions. Time fixed effects are included but not reported.  The sample size is reduced in some models due to data limitation. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustering within countries and years are reported in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
  
Financial R&D Intensity  (Value Added) 
Financial 
R&D 
Intensity 
(Cost) 
Securitization/ 
GDP 
Off-Balance-Sheet 
Items/ Total  Assets 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Growth Opportunity 
(GGO_MA) -0.015 -0.015 -0.020 0.000 -0.013 -0.034 0.014 -0.037 -0.008 
 
[0.021] [0.019] [0.021] [0.021] [0.018] [0.024] [0.132] [0.025] [0.009] 
Overall Activities 
Restrictions 0.042
***    0.045
*** 0.061*** 0.114* 0.001 0.003 
 [0.014]    [0.012] [0.017] [0.060] [0.004] [0.003] 
Official Supervisory 
Power  -0.018
*   -0.017
** -0.006 -0.076 0.006** -0.002 
 
 [0.009]   [0.009] [0.011] [0.066] [0.003] [0.003] 
Overall Capital Stringency   0.110
*  0.040 0.096 0.820
*** -0.005 0.038** 
   [0.063]  [0.053] [0.063] [0.298] [0.007] [0.015] Financial Statement 
Transparency    -0.053
* -0.030 -0.054* 0.065 -0.018** -0.007 
    [0.028] [0.026] [0.031] [0.128] [0.007] [0.008] Statutory Corporate Tax 
Rates  0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.018] [0.001] [0.001] 
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Government Bank 
Ownership -0.757
*** -0.724*** -0.624*** -0.768*** -0.578*** -0.472*** -2.319*** -0.219 0.133*** 
 [0.133] [0.120] [0.122] [0.122] [0.121] [0.143] [0.746] [0.132] [0.048] 
HHI 0.100 -0.165 0.460 -0.197 0.875* 1.162* -3.555** 0.039 0.015 
 [0.533] [0.484] [0.520] [0.485] [0.518] [0.627] [1.792] [0.107] [0.116] 
HHI2 -0.042 0.181 -0.267 0.179 -0.584 -0.807 2.034 0.007 -0.163 
 [0.443] [0.404] [0.434] [0.403] [0.427] [0.510] [1.550] [0.080] [0.102] 
Private Credit 0.203** 0.197** 0.215** 0.194** 0.200** 0.238** 0.065 0.008 -0.021 
 [0.096] [0.099] [0.098] [0.096] [0.088] [0.101] [0.339] [0.019] [0.017] 
Stock Market Cap 0.158* 0.139 0.170* 0.159* 0.218** 0.281*** 1.989*** -0.048*** 0.033 
 [0.088] [0.086] [0.096] [0.090] [0.087] [0.096] [0.563] [0.012] [0.022] 
log GDP -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.062** -0.091*** -0.027 -0.026 -0.238* 0.177 -0.035*** 
 [0.028] [0.027] [0.026] [0.027] [0.023] [0.028] [0.124] [0.234] [0.009] 
log GDP Per Capita -0.014 -0.028 -0.052 -0.031 -0.034 -0.015 -0.524 -0.147 0.047*** 
 [0.056] [0.054] [0.056] [0.054] [0.048] [0.048] [0.342] [0.236] [0.011] 
Security Market Depth      0.090
* -0.205 0.009* 0.030** 
      [0.046] [0.204] [0.005] [0.015] 
Recession      -0.181
** 0.117 0.002 0.015 
            [0.082] [0.406] [0.009] [0.025] 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 327 326 322 334 317 279 283 123 230 
Adjusted R-squared 0.225 0.211 0.208 0.205 0.273 0.779 0.712 0.904 0.597 
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Table 5 
Exogenous growth opportunities and financial innovation in predicting growth 
1997-2010 
 
The sample includes 31 countries between 1997 and 2010. The dependent variables are either the 5-year average 
growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product. 5-year average is used to minimize the influence of higher 
frequency business cycles in our sample. We maximize the time-series content of our estimates by using 
overlapping 5-year periods. Our measures of financial innovation are lagged by three years relative to the 
dependent variables. We measure exogenous growth opportunities as GGO_MA, estimated similarly as in 
Bekaert et al. (2007). Specifically, GGO_MA is the log of the inner product of the vector of global industry PE 
ratios and the vector of country-specific industry weights, less a 60-month moving average. Country-specific 
industry weights are determined by relative equity market capitalization. Data to construct these measures come 
from Datastream. Financial liberalization is an indicator with one indicating financial reform takes place in the 
year in the country. Specifically, it takes a value of one when the change of financial liberalization index is 
larger than zero (Abiad et al., 2010). Financial liberalization index recognizes the multifaceted nature of 
financial reform and records financial policy changes along seven different dimensions: credit controls and 
reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership, policies on securities markets, 
banking regulations, and restrictions on the financial account. Liberalization scores for each category are then 
combined in a graded index. The index ranges from 0 to 21, with a larger number indicating larger extent of 
financial liberalization. The index covers 91 economies. Private credit is a log of private credit divided by GDP. 
Detailed variable definitions and descriptions can be found in Appendix Table A1. We include in the regressions, 
but do not report, country fixed effects. We report the coefficient on the growth opportunities measure and 
interaction terms with two measures of financial R&D intensity, private credit/GDP, stock market cap/GDP, and 
financial liberalization. Observations denote the number of country-years. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors double-clustering within countries and years are reported in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Annual Real Per Capita GDP Growth  
(5-Year Horizon) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
GGO_MA 0.010 0.024 0.027 0.020 
 
[0.022] [0.016] [0.018] [0.022] 
GGO_MA × Financial R&D Intensity  
(Value Added) 
0.022** 0.012*   
 
[0.011] [0.007]   
GGO_MA × Financial R&D Intensity  
(Cost)   
0.005**  
 
  [0.002]  
GGO_MA × Off-Balance-Sheet 
Items/Total  Assets    
0.045*** 
    
[0.012] 
GGO_MA × Private Credit -0.002 -0.008 -0.009* -0.002 
 
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] 
GGO_MA × Stock Market Cap  
0.004 -0.001 -0.007 
 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.021] 
GGO_MA × Financial Liberalization  
0.011* 0.011 0.006 
  
[0.006] [0.008] [0.006] 
Financial R&D Intensity  (Value Added) 
0.009 0.007***   
 
[0.006] [0.002]   
Financial R&D Intensity  (Cost)   
-0.000  
 
  [0.002]  
Off-Balance-Sheet Items/Total  Assets    
-0.026 
    
[0.021] 
Private Credit -0.025*** -0.013*** -0.013* -0.007 
 
[0.009] [0.004] [0.007] [0.006] 
Stock Market Cap  0.004 0.004 0.002 
 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Financial Liberalization  -0.005* -0.004 -0.006** 
 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 292 228 230 256 
Adjusted R-squared 0.664 0.718 0.717 0.676 
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Table 6 
Financial innovation and industry growth 
 
The dependent variable is the average growth rate in real value added across 1996-2009 for each ISIC industry 
in each country, using the data from UNIDO INDSTAT4, 2013. The sample excludes the industrial sectors in the 
US, which serves as the benchmark. Panel A reports the impacts of financial R&D intensity on sectoral growth, 
while Panel B reports the subsample analysis based on security market depth. Securitization measures the 
securitization capacity of a country, proxied by the summation of the outstanding value of all the securitization 
assets, including Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) (including auto, consumer, credit cards, leases, and others), 
CDO, Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) (including CMBS, mixed, and RMBS),  Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SME), and Whole Business Securitization (WBS). The data is available from 1999 to 2009, and 
comes from European Securitization database, prepared by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA) in partnership with the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME). Financial 
innovation is measured using the initial available value across 1996 to 2009 when available. Growth 
opportunities (GO), developed by Fisman and Love (2007), is the industry-level median of firm average growth 
in sales for U.S. firms, from Compustat. Industry's Initial Share of Total Manufacturing VA is the industry's 
share of total value added in manufacturing in 1996, which corrects for base effects in industry growth. Private 
credit is private credit divided by GDP averaged over 1996 and 2009. Detailed variable definitions and 
descriptions can be found in Appendix Table A1. Country and industry specific fixed effects are included in the 
regressions but not reported. All regressions are cross-sectional with one observation per industry in each 
country. The sample size is reduced in some models due to data limitation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustering within countries are reported in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
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Panel A. Baseline regressions 
  Growth in Real Value Added 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
GO × Financial R&D Intensity (Value 
Added) 1.381
**    
 [0.663]    
GO × Financial R&D Intensity (Cost)  0.227
***   
 
 [0.047]   
GO × Securitization/GDP   0.788
**  
 
  [0.319]  
GO × Off-Balance-Sheet Items/Total  
Assets    
0.830 
    
[0.808] 
GO × Private Credit 0.265 0.392
* 0.072 0.302 
 
[0.227] [0.205] [0.565] [0.247] 
GO × Stock Market Cap -0.582 -1.138** -0.847 -0.337 
 
[0.586] [0.424] [0.668] [0.695] 
GO × Financial Liberalization 0.074*** 0.062*** -0.046 0.069*** 
 
[0.019] [0.020] [0.081] [0.019] 
GO × HHI -1.129 -0.227 -0.627 -0.734 
 
[0.685] [0.613] [0.898] [0.700] 
GO × Entry into Banking Requirements -0.020 0.090 0.083 0.066 
 
[0.111] [0.072] [0.117] [0.109] 
Industry's Initial Share of Total 
Manufacturing VA 
0.456 0.485* 0.859* 0.443 
  [0.273] [0.271] [0.446] [0.266] 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 692 692 404 692 
Adjusted R2 0.251 0.255 0.264 0.246 
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Panel B. Subsample analysis 
  Growth in Real Value Added 
 
Security Market Depth Security Market Depth Security Market Depth Security Market Depth 
 
High Low High Low High Low High Low 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
GO × Financial R&D Intensity (Value 
Added) 2.217
*** 1.037       
 [0.683] [0.935]       
GO × Financial R&D Intensity (Cost)   2.846
** 1.048     
   
[1.022] [0.779]     
GO × Off-Balance-Sheet Items/Total  
Assets     
2.237** 2.005   
     
[0.765] [2.114]   
GO × Securitization/GDP       1.114
** -0.035** 
       
[0.312] [0.010] 
GO × Private Credit -0.372 0.244 -2.390 0.239 0.538 1.058** 1.173*** 0.064 
 
[0.806] [0.381] [1.948] [0.357] [1.078] [0.358] [0.277] [1.042] 
GO × Stock Market Cap -0.678* -0.655 0.085 -1.194 0.544 -2.852** -3.333*** 0.017 
 
[0.366] [2.162] [0.424] [2.079] [0.434] [0.798] [0.547] [0.573] 
GO × Financial Liberalization 0.000 0.086*** 0.000 0.087*** 0.000 -0.149** -0.170** 0.000 
 
[0.000] [0.016] [0.000] [0.014] [0.000] [0.050] [0.053] [0.000] 
GO × HHI -2.523** 1.183 -4.824 1.562* -0.804 -0.960 0.073 -1.491 
 
[1.044] [0.774] [2.557] [0.736] [1.247] [1.555] [0.960] [1.527] 
GO × Entry into Banking Requirements -0.123 0.073 -0.613 0.057 -0.151 -2.924** -3.556*** -0.024 
 
[0.113] [0.192] [0.357] [0.188] [0.149] [0.997] [0.592] [0.220] 
Industry's Initial Share of Total 
Manufacturing VA 0.631
*** 0.358 0.722** 0.380 0.778** 0.888 0.917 0.857** 
  [0.117] [0.524] [0.258] [0.550] [0.254] [0.791] [0.799] [0.287] 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Test "High = Low" 5.91** 2.58* 0.02 21.83*** 
Observations 353 339 216 339 216 188 216 188 
Adjusted R2 0.278 0.243 0.192 0.245 0.187 0.241 0.187 0.241 
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Figure 1 
Overall trend of average financial R&D intensity in 32 countries from 1996 to 2009 
 
The figure shows the overall trend of averaged financial R&D intensity (value added) in 32 countries over the 
period from 1996 to 2009. The 32 countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. 
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Figure 2 
Log (Off-balance-sheet items) and Log (Financial R&D expenditure) 
 
The figure shows the correlation between natural logarithm of off-balance-sheet items (in US$ millions) and 
natural logarithm of financial R&D expenditure (in US$ millions). The vertical axis is the natural logarithm of 
the total value of off-balance-sheet items among all the individual banks averaged over 1996-2009 per country, 
and the horizontal axis is the natural logarithm of financial R&D expenditures of all banks averaged over 
1996-2009 per country. The data of off-balance-sheet items come from BankScope. Observations are labeled 
with country codes, as defined in Appendix Table A2. 
 
 
 
Note: Correlation coefficient: 0.6520; P-value: 0.0001 
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Figure 3 
Log (Securitization) and Log (Financial R&D expenditure) 
 
The figure shows the correlation between securitization and natural logarithm of financial R&D expenditure (in 
US$ millions). The vertical axis is the natural logarithm securitization (in US$ millions) for each country 
averaged from 1999 to 2009. Securitization measures the securitization capacity of a country, proxied by the 
summation of the outstanding value of all the securitization assets, including Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) 
(including auto, consumer, credit cards, leases, and others), CDO, Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) 
(including CMBS, mixed, and RMBS),  Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), and Whole Business 
Securitization (WBS). The data is available from 1999 to 2009 for about 20 countries in our sample. The data 
comes from European Securitization database, prepared by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA) in partnership with the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME). The 
horizontal axis is the natural logarithm of financial R&D expenditures of all banks averaged over 1996-2009 per 
country. Observations are labeled with country codes, as defined in Appendix Table A2. 
 
 
Note: Correlation coefficient: 0.6545; P-value: 0.002 
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Appendix Table A1 
Variable definitions and data sources  
 
Variable Definition Original Sources 
Financial Innovation Measures 
Financial R&D 
Intensity (Value 
Added) 
Banking industry's business enterprise R&D expenditure scaled by 
financial intermediation sector's total value added in the previous 
year in each country each year from 1996 to 2009 (reported in 
SourceOECD Statistics 2013). We further multiply by 100 to scale 
the estimated coefficients in our empirical results. The R&D data 
are presenting research and development expenditure statistics in 
financial intermediation industry collected from enterprise and 
bank surveys via the OECD/Eurostat International Survey of 
Resources Devoted to R&D from 32 nations in the world from 1996 
to 2009.  We complement the data by OECD Science, Technology 
and R&D Statistics for some missing data. R&D and related 
concepts follow internationally agreed standards defined by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), published in the ‘Frascati’ Manual. 
SourceOECD 
Statistics 2013 
Financial R&D 
Intensity (Cost) 
Banking industry's business enterprise research and development 
expenditure scaled by banking sector's total revenue in each country 
each year from 1996 to 2009. Operating cost refers to total 
non-interest expenses. The information is drawn from OECD 
Banking Statistics. For the missing values in some countries, we 
complement by the data from BankScope. Specifically, we 
aggregate all the banks' operating expenses for each country each 
year in BankScope. We further multiply Financial R&D Intensity 
by 100 to scale the estimated coefficients in our empirical results.  
SourceOECD 
Statistics 2013, 
OECD Banking 
Statistics, 
BankScope 
Securitization/GDP Securitization measures the securitization capacity of a country, 
proxied by the summation of the outstanding value of all the 
securitization assets, including Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) 
(including auto, consumer, credit cards, leases, and others), CDO, 
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) (including CMBS, mixed, and 
RMBS),  Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), and Whole 
Business Securitization (WBS). The data is available from 1999 to 
2009 for about 20 countries in our sample. The data comes from 
European Securitization database, prepared by the Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) in 
partnership with the Association for Financial Markets in Europe 
(AFME). 
SIFMA and AFME 
Off-Balance-Sheet 
Items/Total  Assets 
The total value of off-balance-sheet items divided by total assets for 
all the individual banks. The measure is at bank level for bank-level 
analysis. For the country-level analysis, the measure is aggregated 
for each country.  
BankScope 
Bank Level Analysis Variables  
Bank Asset Growth The growth rate of bank asset for a bank. BankScope 
Bank Loan Growth Total loan growth rate of a bank. BankScope 
Bank Profit Growth Total revenue growth rate of a bank. BankScope 
Log Z-score Equals to log of (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA=π/A is return 
on assets and CAR = E/A is capital-asset ratio. σ(ROA) is standard 
deviation of ROA over a five-year non-overlapping window across 
1996-2010. Higher z implies more stability. 
BankScope 
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Change in ROA ROA change between 2008 and 2006, which is calculated as 
ROA2008 - ROA2006. 
BankScope 
Buy-and-Hold Stock 
Returns July 
2007-December 
2008 
Buy-and-hold stock for each bank over the period returns July 
2007-December 2008. 
Datastream, 
BankScope 
High Security 
Market Depth 
This measure is to capture a country's security market activities and 
the ability to securitize asset. Summation of the value of listed 
shares to GDP, the private domestic debt securities issued by 
financial institutions and corporations as a share of GDP, and the 
public domestic debt securities issued by government as a share of 
GDP. A country is regarded as having high security market depth if 
its measure is higher than the median of the sample in a year. 
Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine (2000), 
updated in 2013 
Bank Market Share The share of each bank’s deposits to total deposits within a given 
country.  
BankScope 
Loan to Asset Ratio The ratio of loans to total assets.  BankScope 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio The ratio of tier 1 capital to total assets. BankScope 
Other Earnings 
Assets 
The ratio between the sum of derivatives, other securities, and other 
remaining assets and the sum of loans and other earning assets. 
BankScope 
Too-big-to-fail A dummy variable that takes a value of one if the bank’s share in 
the country’s total deposits exceeds 10%. 
BankScope 
HHI To control for competition we use a Herfindahl index, defined as 
the sum of the squared shares of bank deposits to total deposits 
within a given country, over the period 1996 to 2009. 
BankScope 
Foreign Bank 
Ownership 
The percentage of total shares held by the foreign country. Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine (2000), 
updated in 2013 
Overall Activities 
Restrictions 
The index measures the degree to which banks face regulatory 
restrictions on their activities in (a) securities markets, (b) 
insurance, (c) real-estate, and (d) owning shares in non-financial 
firms. For each of these four sub-categories, the value ranges from a 
0 to 4, where a 4 indicates the most restrictive regulations on this 
sub-category of bank activity. Thus, the index of overall restrictions 
can potentially range from 0 to 16. 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2001, 2006 
and 2008) 
Official Supervisory 
Power 
Principal component indicator of 14 dummy variables. The index 
measures the degree to which the country’s commercial bank 
supervisory agency has the authority to take specific actions. It is 
composed of information on many features of official supervision 
based on the questions such as: 1. Does the supervisory agency 
have the right to meet with external auditors to discuss their report 
without the approval of the bank? 2. Are auditors required by law to 
communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed 
involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit 
activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 3. Can supervisors take legal 
action against external auditors for negligence? 4. Can the 
supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal 
organizational structure? 5. Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to 
supervisors? The index has a maximum value of 14 and a minimum 
value of 0, where larger numbers indicate greater power. 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2001, 2006 
and 2008) 
3 
 
Entry into Banking 
Requirements 
The index is developed based on eight questions regarding whether 
various types of legal submission are required to obtain a banking 
license. Which of the following are legally required to be submitted 
before issuance of the banking license? (1) Draft by- laws? (2) 
Intended organization chart? (3) Financial projections for first three 
years? (4) Financial information on main potential shareholders? 
(5) Background/ experience of future directors? (6) Background/ 
experience of future managers? (7) Sources of funds to be disbursed 
in the capitalization of new bank? (8) Market differentiation 
intended for the new bank? The index ranges from zero (low entry 
requirement) to eight (high entry requirement). Higher values 
indicate greater stringency. 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2001, 2006 
and 2008) 
Tight Capital 
Regulation 
The index is constructed from seven variables that indicate whether 
the capital requirement reflects certain risk elements and deducts 
certain market value losses from capital adequacy is determined. 
For example, this measure takes into account whether the minimum 
capital-asset ratio requirement is in line with the Basel guidelines; 
whether the minimum ratio varies as a function of an individual 
bank's credit risk and market risk; and whether the market value of 
loan losses not realized in accounting books, unrealized losses in 
securities portfolios, and/or unrealized foreign exchange losses are 
deducted from the book value of capital. Higher values indicating 
greater stringency. 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2001, 2006 
and 2008) 
Financial Statement 
Transparency 
The transparency of bank financial statements practices. It includes 
the information on whether accrued, though unpaid, 
interest/principal enter the income statement; whether financial 
institutions are required to produce consolidated accounts covering 
all bank and any non-bank financial subsidiaries; whether 
off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the public; whether banks 
are required to disclose their risk management procedures to the 
public; and whether bank directors are legally liable if information 
disclosed is erroneous or misleading. Higher values indicate better 
transparency. 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2001, 2006 
and 2008) 
Tangible Equity Equity minus intangible assets whenever available or equity when 
intangible assets are not available divided by total assets. 
BankScope 
Deposits Total deposits divided by total assets. BankScope 
Non-interest The share of operating income not due to interest income. BankScope 
Income Diversity One minus the absolute value of the ratio of the difference between 
net interest income and other operating income to total operating 
income. 
BankScope 
Log GDP Natural logarithm of the real GDP (US Dollars) World 
Development 
Indicators (2012) 
Log GDP Per Capita Natural logarithm of GDP per capita (US Dollars) World 
Development 
Indicators (2012) 
GDP Growth 
Volatility 
Standard deviation of growth rates in real GDP in the previous five 
years. 
World 
Development 
Indicators (2012) 
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Financial 
Liberalization 
Financial liberalization index recognizes the multifaceted nature of 
financial reform and records financial policy changes along seven 
different dimensions: credit controls and reserve requirements, 
interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership, policies on 
securities markets, banking regulations, and restrictions on the 
financial account. Liberalization scores for each category are then 
combined in a graded index. The index ranges from 0 to 21, and 
then is normalized to be within (0, 1), with a larger number 
indicating larger extent of financial liberalization. The index was 
introduced by Abiad and Mody (2005) and extended in Abiad et al. 
(2010). The extended version covers 91 economies.  
Abiad and Mody 
(2005), Abiad et al. 
(2010) 
Market 
Segmentation 
The caculation of market segmentation follows Bekaert et et al. 
(2011). It measures the degree of effective or de facto equity market 
segmentation for a country, and is computed as the value-weighted 
average of the absolute difference between a country's local 
industry earnings yields and the corresponding global industry 
earnings yields. We use the average value from 2001 to 2005 for 
each country in our analysis. A higher value indicates higher level 
of market segmentation and lower level of integration with the 
global market. 
Bekaert et et al. 
(2011), Datastream 
and Standard & 
Poor's Emerging 
Market Data Base. 
R&D Intensity in 
Manufacturing 
Industry (Placebo 
Test) 
Manufacturing industry's business enterprise R&D expenditure 
scaled by manufacturing sector's total value added in the previous 
year in each country each year from 1996 to 2009 (reported in 
SourceOECD Statistics 2010). We further multiply by 100 to scale 
the estimated coefficients in our empirical results. The R&D data 
are presenting research and development expenditure statistics in 
manufacturing industry collected from enterprise surveys via the 
OECD/Eurostat International Survey of Resources Devoted to 
R&D from 32 nations in the world from 1996 to 2009. We 
complement the data by OECD Science, Technology and R&D 
Statistics for some missing data. R&D and related concepts follow 
internationally agreed standards defined by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), published in the 
‘Frascati’ Manual. 
SourceOECD 
Statistics 2013 
Exogenous Growth Opportunities Analysis Variables 
Annual Real GDP 
Growth  
(5-year horizon) 
Growth of real per capita gross domestic product. Available for all 
countries from 1980 to 2010. 
World 
Development 
Indicators (2012) 
Annual Real 
Investment Growth  
(5-year horizon) 
Growth of real per capita gross fixed capital formation, which 
includes land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on), 
plant, machinery, and equipment purchases, and the construction of 
roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, 
private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial 
buildings. 
World 
Development 
Indicators (2012) 
GGO_MA We measure exogenous growth opportunities as GGO_MA, 
estimated similarly as in Bekaert et al. (2007). Specifically, 
GGO_MA is the log of the inner product of the vector of global 
industry PE ratios and the vector of country-specific industry 
weights, less a 60-month moving average. Country-specific 
industry weights are determined by relative equity market 
capitalization.  
Datastream 
Private Credit Private credit divided by GDP. Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine (2000), 
updated in 2013 
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Stock Market Cap Value of listed shares to GDP. Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine (2000), 
updated in 2013 
Recession Recession is a dummy variable indicating whether a country is 
experiencing a recession in a particular year, which is constructed 
following Braun and Larrain (2005).  
Braun and Larrain 
(2005) 
Financial 
Liberalization 
Financial liberalization is an indicator with one indicating financial 
reform takes place in the year in the country. Specifically, it takes a 
value of one when the change of financial liberalization index is 
larger than zero (Abiad et al., 2010). Financial liberalization index 
recognizes the multifaceted nature of financial reform and records 
financial policy changes along seven different dimensions: credit 
controls and reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry 
barriers, state ownership, policies on securities markets, banking 
regulations, and restrictions on the financial account. Liberalization 
scores for each category are then combined in a graded index. The 
index ranges from 0 to 21, with a larger number indicating larger 
extent of financial liberalization. The index was introduced by 
Abiad and Mody (2005) and extended in Abiad et al. (2010). The 
extended version covers 91 economies.  
Abiad and Mody 
(2005), Abiad et al. 
(2010) 
Industrial Level Analysis Variables 	
Average Growth 
Rate in Real Value 
Added  
The average growth rate in real value added for 1996-2009 for each 
industry in each country. The sample excludes the industrial sectors 
in the US, which serves as the benchmark (Rajan and Zingales, 
1998).  
UNIDO 
INDSTAT4, 2013 
GO Growth opportunities (GO), developed by Fisman and Love (2007), 
is the industry-level median of firm average growth in sales for U.S. 
firms, from Compustat.   
Fisman and Love 
(2007), Compustat 
HHI To control for competition we use a Herfindahl index, defined as 
the sum of the squared shares of bank deposits to total deposits 
within a given country, averaged over the period 1996 to 2009. 
BankScope 
Private Credit Private credit divided by GDP. Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine (2000), 
updated in 2013 
Stock Market Cap Value of listed shares to GDP. Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine (2000), 
updated in 2013 
Entry into Banking 
Requirements 
The index is developed based on eight questions regarding whether 
various types of legal submission are required to obtain a banking 
license. Which of the following are legally required to be submitted 
before issuance of the banking license? (1) Draft by- laws? (2) 
Intended organization chart? (3) Financial projections for first three 
years? (4) Financial information on main potential shareholders? 
(5) Background/ experience of future directors? (6) Background/ 
experience of future managers? (7) Sources of funds to be disbursed 
in the capitalization of new bank? (8) Market differentiation 
intended for the new bank? The index ranges from zero (low entry 
requirement) to eight (high entry requirement). Higher values 
indicate greater stringency. 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2001, 2006 
and 2008) 
Industry's Initial 
Share of Total 
Manufacturing VA 
The industry’s share of total value added in manufacturing in 1996 
for each industry in each country, which corrects for base effects in 
industry growth. 
UNIDO 
INDSTAT4, 2013 
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Appendix Table A2 
Summary statistics for financial R&D expenditure across countries over 1996-2009  
 
The table reports the summary statistics for financial R&D expenditure (in Million USD) across 32 countries, 
over the period from 1996 to 2009. 
  
Country Country Code Mean SD 
Australia AUS 590.44 528.77 
Austria AUT 31.66 13.81 
Belgium BEL 57.27 39.02 
Canada CAN 252.22 90.36 
Czech Republic CZE 22.75 38.88 
Denmark DNK 102.69 74.76 
Germany DEU 132.40 127.01 
Greece GRC 2.41 3.04 
Hungary HUN 1.19 1.00 
Iceland ISL 2.18 1.40 
Ireland IRL 8.91 8.77 
Israel ISR 9.27 11.58 
Italy ITA 173.99 84.57 
Japan JPN 16.58 5.33 
Korea KOR 2.89 4.34 
Luxembourg LUX 58.32 15.32 
Mexico MEX 61.83 46.63 
Netherlands NLD 104.37 66.80 
New Zealand NZL 3.44 2.17 
Norway NOR 48.25 28.23 
Poland POL 6.30 7.65 
Portugal PRT 98.02 107.33 
Romania ROM 0.51 0.53 
Russian Federation RUS 0.61 0.72 
Singapore SGP 40.16 42.04 
South Africa ZAF 335.38 216.95 
Spain ESP 106.23 91.30 
Sweden SWE 91.31 9.14 
Switzerland CHE 94.05 19.76 
Turkey TUR 78.59 65.70 
United Kingdom GBR 1178.37 1160.60 
United States USA 1936.38 771.69 
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Appendix Table A3 
Correlation matrix 
 
This table reports the correlation matrix between measures of financial R&D intensity and other variables in our analysis. Observations are for each country each year from 
1996 to 2009. Detailed variable definitions and descriptions can be found in Appendix Table A1. P-values are reported in the parentheses below the correlation coefficients. *, 
**, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Financial R&D Intensity (Value Added) 1 
    	 	 	 	 
     	 	 	 	Financial R&D Intensity (Cost) 0.501*** 1 
   	 	 	 	
 
(0.000) 
    	 	 	 	Off-Balance-Sheet Items/Total  Assets 0.042 0.112** 1 
  	 	 	 	
 
(0.440) (0.042) 
   	 	 	 	Securitization/GDP -0.071 0.045 -0.111 1 
 	 	 	 	
 
(0.372) (0.579) (0.178) 
  	 	 	 	R&D Intensity in Service Industry 0.309*** 0.164*** 0.192*** 0.347*** 1 
	 	 	 	
 
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
 	 	 	 	R&D Intensity in Manufacturing Industry 0.314*** 0.035 -0.174** 0.148 0.224*** 1 
	 	 	
 
(0.000) (0.611) (0.022) (0.129) (0.001) 
	 	 	 	Private Credit 0.290*** 0.098** -0.081 0.551*** 0.176*** 0.471*** 1 
	 	
 
(0.000) (0.048) (0.132) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
	 	 	Stock Market Cap 0.291*** 0.274*** 0.036 0.213*** 0.211*** 0.489*** 0.530*** 1 
	
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.507) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
	 	Log GDP Per Capita 0.227*** -0.074 -0.067 0.247*** 0.361*** 0.551*** 0.659*** 0.366*** 1 
  (0.000) (0.148) (0.241) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 		
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Appendix Table A4 
Placebo test 
 
This table reports the placebo test, using R&D intensity in manufacturing industry as the measure instead of 
Financial R&D Intensity. The dependent variables are Bank Asset Growth and Log Z-score as in Table 2, and 
ROA Change as in Table 3. Detailed variable definitions and descriptions can be found in Appendix Table 
A1.The sample size is reduced in some models due to data limitation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustering within countries are reported in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%.  
 
  Bank Asset Growth   Log Z-score   ROA Change 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
R&D Intensity in Manufacturing Industry 1.320  4.498  0.005 
 [1.743]  [9.591]  [0.009] 
Overall Activities Restrictions -0.009 
 
-0.036  0.001
*** 
 
[0.015] 
 
[0.081]  [0.000] 
Entry into Banking Requirements -0.010 
 
-0.033  0.003
*** 
 
[0.013] 
 
[0.164]  [0.001] 
Official Supervisory Power 0.009 
 
-0.060  -0.001
*** 
 
[0.014] 
 
[0.063]  [0.000] 
Capital Regulatory Index -0.041 
 
0.025  0.001
*** 
 
[0.036] 
 
[0.185]  [0.000] 
Financial Statement Transparency 0.014 
 
0.221  -0.004
*** 
 
[0.023] 
 
[0.199]  [0.001] 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio -0.216*** 
 
-0.938  0.061
*** 
 
[0.059] 
 
[1.014]  [0.024] 
Other Earning Assets -0.121** 
 
2.142***   
 
[0.058] 
 
[0.585]   
Bank Market Share -0.067 
 
1.191***  0.025 
 
[0.082] 
 
[0.416]  [0.017] 
Loan to Asset Ratio -0.000 
 
0.562  0.013
*** 
 
[0.055] 
 
[0.450]  [0.004] 
Too-Big-To-Fail 0.018 
 
-0.282  -0.002 
 
[0.039] 
 
[0.370]  [0.004] 
HHI 0.058 
 
-0.472  -0.054
*** 
 
[0.086] 
 
[0.323]  [0.013] 
Foreign Bank Ownership -0.298 
 
0.302  -0.003 
  [0.390]   [0.828]   [0.003] 
Other Country Controls Yes 
 
Yes  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes  No 
Time Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes  No 
Observations 6,174 
 
5,879 
 
1,196 
Adjusted R2 0.107   0.113   0.083 
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Appendix Figure A1 
Log (#patents filings per $billion GDP) and manufacturing R&D intensity 
 
The figure shows the correlation between Log (#patents filings per $billion GDP) and manufacturing R&D 
intensity. The vertical axis is a log of the number of patents filings per $Billion GDP averaged over the period 
1997-2007 per country, and the horizontal axis is R&D intensity in manufacturing sector scaled by value added 
in manufacturing, averaged over 1996-2006. Patents data come from the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) Statistics Database. Observations are labeled with country codes, as defined in Appendix 
Table A1. 
 
 
Note: Correlation coefficient: 0.5097; P-value: 0.0056 
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